ARTICLES

Asymmetric Subsidies and the Bail Crisis
John F. Duffy† & Richard M. Hynes††
When individuals are arrested or indicted for a crime, governments have legitimate interests in assuring that those individuals show up for future legal proceedings and also do not cause more social harm in the meanwhile. To serve those legitimate interests, governments may restrain the personal liberty of those
presumptively innocent individuals—traditionally accomplished either by incarceration or by release subject to certain sureties and conditions. The choice, in short, is
between jail and bail.
Currently, governments skew that choice by subsidizing the costs of jail but not
bail. The result—wholly predictable given the size and asymmetric nature of the
subsidy—is that the United States maintains an inefficiently large jail population
that both costs taxpayers too much and excessively limits the liberty of too many.
Prior commentators and reformers have correctly identified the overuse of pretrial
detention in jails as a major public policy crisis and have urged substantial reforms
to current bail processes up to and including the abolition of state constitutional
rights to bail (as one state has recently done). We believe that the hostility toward
bail overlooks the root cause of the problem, which is the asymmetric subsidization
of jail over bail. We propose a balanced subsidization system that can preserve the
beneficial aspects of a traditional bail surety system while (i) reducing unnecessary
and inefficient restraints on individual liberty, (ii) addressing the distributional inequities of current practices, and (iii) saving taxpayers billions of dollars per year.
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INTRODUCTION
The last several years have seen “a truly astounding” and
“unprecedented” outpouring of scholarship and commentary decrying the large number of individuals held in pretrial detention,
measuring the negative social consequences of such detention,
and debating what to do about it.1 As multiple prior
1
Kellen Funk, The Present Crisis in American Bail, 128 YALE L.J.F. 1098, 1113
(2019). For just a sample of the more prominent articles, see Russell M. Gold, Jail as Injunction, 107 GEO. L.J. 501, 544–52 (2019); Lauryn P. Gouldin, Defining Flight Risk, 85 U.
CHI. L. REV. 677, 737–38 (2018); Sandra G. Mayson, Dangerous Defendants, 127 YALE L.J.
490, 506–08, 557–66 (2018); Megan T. Stevenson, Distortion of Justice: How the Inability
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commentators have documented, approximately a half-million individuals are held in pretrial detention on any given day.2 A majority—perhaps even a large majority—of those individuals remain incarcerated even though the courts have found them not
dangerous enough to require continued incarceration and, accordingly, have set bail bond amounts and conditions providing sufficient sureties to justify their release.3 In short, hundreds of thousands of presumptively innocent4 people sit in jail every day
because they both lack sufficient assets to post bonds themselves
and are too poor to afford the fees of private bail sureties who
could post bonds. Moreover, because pretrial detentions typically
last only a portion of a year, the annual number of individuals
detained pretrial easily reaches into the millions.5 It is thus not

to Pay Bail Affects Case Outcomes, 34 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 511, 530–38 (2018); Paul Heaton,
Sandra Mayson & Megan Stevenson, The Downstream Consequences of Misdemeanor Pretrial Detention, 69 STAN. L. REV. 711, 769–72, 780–86 (2017); Jocelyn Simonson, Bail Nullification, 115 MICH. L. REV. 585, 594–95, 599–600, 607–11 (2017); Crystal S. Yang, Toward an Optimal Bail System, 92 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1399, 1417–29, 1472–92 (2017); Samuel
R. Wiseman, Pretrial Detention and the Right to be Monitored, 123 YALE L.J. 1344, 1353–
80 (2014); Laura I. Appleman, Justice in the Shadowlands: Pretrial Detention, Punishment, & the Sixth Amendment, 69 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1297, 1318–21, 1361–67 (2012);
Shima Baradaran Baughman, Costs of Pretrial Detention, 97 B.U. L. REV. 1, 4–7 (2017).
The literature also includes substantial contributions from various public policy centers,
including well-researched reports from the Hamilton Project of the Brookings Institution
and the Justice Policy Institute. See generally PATRICK LIU, RYAN NUNN & JAY
SHAMBAUGH, BROOKINGS INST., THE ECONOMICS OF BAIL AND PRETRIAL DETENTION
(2018); JUST. POL’Y INST., BAIL FAIL: WHY THE U.S. SHOULD END THE PRACTICE OF USING
MONEY FOR BAIL (2012).
2
See Wiseman, supra note 1, at 1346 (relying on data from 2011 and concluding
that “roughly half a million people in the United States are in jail awaiting the resolution
of the charges against them at any given time”); Yang, supra note 1, at 1401 (citing 2014
data to estimate that “almost half a million” people are in pretrial detention); Wendy Sawyer & Peter Wagner, Mass Incarceration: The Whole Pie 2020, PRISON POL’Y INITIATIVE
(Mar. 24, 2020), https://perma.cc/9924-HEM9 (estimating that over 555,000 people are in
pretrial detention).
3
See Yang, supra note 1, at 1401 (concluding that “the majority of defendants are
detained before trial because they cannot afford to pay relatively small amounts of bail”).
An article by Professors Emily Leslie and Nolan G. Pope, The Unintended Impact of Pretrial Detention on Case Outcomes: Evidence from New York City Arraignments, 60 J.L. &
ECON. 529, 536 tbl.1, 544 (2017), reports data from New York City showing that 93% of
felony defendants and 95% of misdemeanor defendants in pretrial detention are “held on
bail, which means that they failed to put up the amount of money set by the arraignment
judge.”
4
See Coffin v. United States, 156 U.S. 432, 453 (1895) (describing the “presumption
of innocence in favor of the accused” as “the undoubted law, axiomatic and elementary,”
and as lying “at the foundation of the administration of our criminal law”).
5
See Sawyer & Wagner, supra note 2, at n.2 (estimating that “at least 4.9 million
unique individuals were arrested and booked into jails in 2017”). Professor Lauryn
Gouldin relies on 2016 data to estimate that “11 million people move through” U.S. jails
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hyperbole to estimate that our criminal justice “system casually
detains millions of people each year on bonds they cannot pay.”6
Not surprisingly, incarcerating hundreds of thousands of
nondangerous, presumptively innocent individuals on a daily basis imposes huge costs—in terms of both the financial expenditures by governments and the harder-to-measure (but nonetheless very real) social costs. Direct expenditures by federal, state,
and local governments on all pretrial detentions have been reasonably estimated at $38 million per day, or nearly $14 billion per
year.7 If even half of those in detention are there because of a financial inability to post a bail bond, governments are spending
$7 billion to detain bailable, nondangerous defendants. Moreover,
such direct governmental expenditures are only one component of
the complete social costs, which may be many billions of dollars
higher.8
The high costs of pretrial detention, coupled with the seemingly unfair and inefficient practice of jailing nondangerous defendants merely because they are too poor to post bail, have
drawn intense criticism. The country’s system of pretrial detention has been described as being in “shambles”9 and as a “broken
system” that imposes “staggering costs” on both defendants and
taxpayers and that is filled with “inequities and inefficiencies.”10

per year, Gouldin, supra note 1, at 678, though this figure likely does not count unique
individuals.
6
Sandra G. Mayson, Detention by Any Other Name, 69 DUKE L.J. 1643, 1645 & n.9
(2020). The statement is reasonable so long as “millions” is construed to mean only about
two million. Professor Mayson’s data suggests a range between 1.7 and 2.8 million
(5.3 million unique individuals arrested and jailed, at least temporarily, with 32%–53%
being detained in jail due to an inability to post bond).
7
PRETRIAL JUST. INST., PRETRIAL JUSTICE: HOW MUCH DOES IT COST? 2 (2017).
That estimate is derived by multiplying a conservative estimate of the number of pretrial
detainees (450,000) with a reasonable estimate for the cost per day of pretrial detention
for one detainee ($85). The estimate has been widely cited in the popular and academic
literature. See, e.g., Heaton et al., supra note 1, at 781 n.227; Dorothy Weldon, Note, More
Appealing: Reforming Bail Review in State Courts, 118 COLUM. L. REV. 2401, 2442 n.271
(2018); Note, Bail Reform and Risk Assessment: The Cautionary Tale of Federal Sentencing, 131 HARV. L. REV. 1125, 1128 n.32 (2018); Yang, supra note 1, at 1401 n.3; Nick Wing,
Our Money Bail System Costs U.S. Taxpayers $38 Million a Day, HUFFINGTON POST (Jan.
24, 2017), https://perma.cc/K7TH-WZJZ.
8
See, e.g., Ben Gifford, Prison Crime and the Economics of Incarceration, 71 STAN.
L. REV. 71, 90, 93, 129 (2019) (finding the total social costs of incarceration, accounting for
the costs of prison crime, to be approximately two to three times the direct governmental
expenditures on incarceration); see also infra note 176 (discussing the sources of such additional social costs).
9
Appleman, supra note 1, at 1369.
10 Gouldin, supra note 1, at 677, 679.
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Among the practices of the pretrial detention system, bail has
been singled out for a special degree of scorn by top scholars. To
Professor Sandra Mayson, “money bail” is “a system that conditions liberty on wealth” and is “both unjust and inefficient.”11 Professor Russell Gold views “money bail systems” as “fundamentally flawed” because they “detain too many people who are not
dangerous and grant liberty to defendants who are.”12 Professor
Crystal Yang describes current bail practices as “largely ignor[ing] private and social costs”—harsh words from a law and
economics scholar—and, even worse, as “potentially generating
massive losses to social welfare.”13 Professor Samuel Wiseman
simply condemns bail as “an archaic institution” that “consistently results in detention for poverty.”14
To modern scholars, the path forward in reforming the nation’s pretrial detention practices is to shift from the so-called
wealth-based system of private bail to a “risk-based” system.15 Importantly, such risk-based systems involve government agents assisted by new technologies—judges or magistrates armed with
computerized risk-assessment tools and judicial or executive
branch agents deploying electronic monitoring tools such as GPS
ankle bracelets or cell phone tracking technology. Such scholarship is not mere idle academic chatter. A broad range of public
policy centers and think tanks have taken up the cause, and several states have fundamentally changed (or are in the process of
changing) their laws on pretrial detention. Most dramatically,
New Jersey recently repealed its state constitutional provision
guaranteeing the right of defendants to “be bailable by sufficient
sureties”16—language tracing back to the seventeenth century
and surviving in more than twenty state constitutions17—and
11

Mayson, supra note 1, at 492.
Gold, supra note 1, at 527.
13 Yang, supra note 1, at 1404, 1492.
14 Wiseman, supra note 1, at 1350, 1352.
15 John Logan Koepke & David G. Robinson, Danger Ahead: Risk Assessment and the
Future of Bail Reform, 93 WASH. L. REV. 1725, 1746 (2018) (describing the “central goal”
of recent reform efforts as being “to end the wealth-based system, and move pretrial justice
systems toward a risk-based model”); see also Mayson, supra note 1, at 508 (describing the
recent reform movement as trying to “shift[ ] the entire pretrial paradigm from a cashbased to a risk-based model”); id. at 492 (stating that the “core reform goal is to untether
pretrial detention from wealth and tie it directly to risk”).
16 N.J. CONST., art. I, ¶ 11 (amended 2017).
17 The language dates back to Pennsylvania’s 1682 colonial constitution, which guaranteed that, with certain limited exceptions, “all Prisoners shall be Bailable by Sufficient
Sureties.” June Carbone, Seeing Through the Emperor’s New Clothes: Rediscovery of Basic
Principles in the Administration of Bail, 34 SYRACUSE L. REV. 517, 531 (1983) (quoting 5
12
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replaced that guarantee with language permitting the abolition
of private bail in favor of a governmentally run system of pretrial
risk assessment and monitoring.18
This Article departs from prior scholarship by focusing not
merely on the current bail system (with its concededly troubling
aspects) but on the entire system of governmental funding for pretrial restraints on liberty. Focusing on the current bail system in
isolation misses the root of the problem. Bail, after all, is a good
thing. Bail gets people released from jail. Indeed, a large number
of state constitutions expressly guarantee a right to bail, and the
practice is recognized in the Bill of Rights.19
Bail is not the problem. The problem is that, out of the range
of pretrial restraints on liberty, our society subsidizes the full cost
(or nearly so) of the most restrictive option—jail—and leaves the
bail or surety option open only to those who can afford it or who
have friends or relatives willing to subsidize it. Stated another
way, current practice puts the power of the public fisc on the side
of restraining the personal liberty of presumptively innocent individuals to the maximum extent possible. It should then be absolutely unsurprising that our country has such an excessively
large pretrial jail population. Consistent with basic economic
principles, the country is getting a lot more of what it is heavily
funding.
To address that problem, this Article proposes a symmetric
subsidization system in which, at least for the poor, the government would subsidize the costs of bail sureties up to the expected
costs of jail. Such a change has many advantages. First of all, it
is far less radical than the abolition of a previously cherished
AMERICAN CHARTERS 3061 (F. Thorpe ed. 1909)). It was incorporated in Pennsylvania’s
Revolutionary Constitution and thereafter served as a “model for almost every state constitution adopted after 1776.” Id. at 532. It remains unchanged in the current Pennsylvania Constitution. See PA. CONST. art. I, § 14; see also Matthew J. Hegreness, America’s
Fundamental and Vanishing Right to Bail, 55 ARIZ. L. REV. 909, 920, 939, 966 (2013) (also
tracing the “sufficient sureties” language to the Pennsylvania charter of 1682 and counting, at that time, twenty-four state constitutions that continued to guarantee the right
with that or similar language).
18 See N.J. CONST., art. 1, ¶ 11 (providing merely that defendants will be “eligible for
pretrial release” and stating the circumstances in which such pretrial release “may be
denied” (emphasis added)); see also State v. Robinson, 229 N.J. 44, 52 (2017) (noting that
“[b]efore this year, New Jersey had long guaranteed defendants the right to bail” (emphasis
added)). Following the constitutional change, New Jersey “replaced [its] prior heavy reliance on monetary bail” with a largely governmentally run system that “calls for an objective evaluation of each defendant’s risk level and consideration of conditions of release
that pretrial services officers will monitor.” Id. at 54.
19 U.S. CONST. amend. VIII (stating that “[e]xcessive bail shall not be required”).
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constitutional right to bail (as New Jersey has done). It also respects the tradition of bail as a check by private actors against
potential abuse by governmental actors. And it makes sense economically, as it will likely lower the social costs of the pretrial
detention system while saving the government money.
We pause here to address explicitly what, to a modern reader,
may seem like four stumbling blocks to our thesis. First, it may
seem utterly wrong to complain about an asymmetry between jail
and bail because the two are not at all similar. Indeed, it may
seem that jail and bail are closer to opposites than substitutes,
with jail being confinement and bail being the “price” placed on
pretrial freedom.20 That view, however, is deeply ahistorical.
For centuries, bail was thought of as a system of custodial
suretyship that was a substitute for jail. As William Blackstone
explained it, bailed prisoners “instead of going to gaol” (pronounced “jail”) are maintained in the “friendly custody” of their
“sureties.”21 As another eighteenth-century treatise put it, bail allows a defendant to have “Gaolers of his own choosing,” and “the
end of the Law” is for bail agents to “put [bailed defendants] as
much under the Power of the Court as if he had been in Custody
of the proper Officer.”22 Even earlier, the seventeenth-century jurist Matthew Hale took the same view, writing that “he that is
bailed, is in supposition of law still in custody, and the parties
that take him to bail are in law his keepers.”23 Such sources have

20 So common is the modern view of bail being a price of freedom that it occurs in
multiple titles in the relevant literature. See, e.g., Lydia D. Johnson, The Politics of the
Bail System: What’s the Price for Freedom?, 17 SCHOLAR: ST. MARY’S L. REV. ON RACE &
SOC. JUST. 171, 171 (2015); HUM. RTS. WATCH, THE PRICE OF FREEDOM: BAIL AND
PRETRIAL DETENTION OF LOW INCOME NONFELONY DEFENDANTS IN NEW YORK CITY 1
(2010), https://perma.cc/6QQV-CEY5. Describing bail as a way to “purchase” freedom can
be traced back to academic work in the early twentieth century. ARTHUR LAWTON BEELEY,
THE BAIL SYSTEM IN CHICAGO 157 (1927) (describing the plight of those unable to post bail
as “too poor to purchase [their] freedom pending trial”). By the 1970s, the phraseology had
even entered into the U.S. Reports, with the Supreme Court describing bail as the “premium price for [a defendant’s] pretrial freedom.” Schilb v. Kuebel, 404 U.S. 357, 366
(1971). In differing forms and language, viewing bail being a way to pay a price for freedom
or liberty is ubiquitous in the modern literature. See, e.g., Darryl K. Brown, The Case for
a Trial Fee: What Money Can Buy in Criminal Process, 107 CALIF. L. REV. 1415, 1416
(2019) (describing “money bail” as allowing “defendants [to] pay both private bail bond
firms and local governments for pretrial liberty”).
21 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *294.
22 2 WILLIAM HAWKINS, A TREATISE OF THE PLEAS OF THE CROWN 115–16 (reprt. 1978).
23 2 MATTHEW HALE, THE HISTORY OF THE PLEAS OF THE CROWN 124 (London E. &
R. Nutt & R. Gosling 1736).
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been continuously cited by U.S. courts into the current era,24 and
they clearly demonstrate, as Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg explained, that the common law distinction between pretrial incarceration and bail is “a distinction between methods of retaining
control over a defendant’s person, not one between seizure and its
opposite.”25
Paradoxically, the more bail is viewed traditionally—as the
“friendly custody” by a jailer of the defendant’s own choosing—
the more the dramatic difference in funding for the two forms of
pretrial custody (nearly 100% for jail and 0% for bail) seems fundamentally wrong and in need of a new approach. The key to appreciating the case for symmetrically funding jail and bail is to
recognize that, in subsidizing a defendant’s bail, the government
is not buying the defendant’s freedom—it could give that to the
defendant for free. Rather, it is buying a surety who will evaluate
the riskiness of release, take some responsibility for the defendant,
and pay a potentially hefty price (the bail bond amount) if the
defendant flees. And sureties cost money.26
Second, some readers might object to our proposal because
they view it as eliminating economic incentives that, under the
current conventional wisdom, are fundamental to bail. The “long
tradition” of bail in this country might be thought to be based on
the idea that defendants are required “to post some form of collateral in order to incentivize them to appear at a trial.”27 That

24 See Castillo v. United States, 816 F.3d 1300, 1304–05 (11th Cir. 2016) (first citing
4 BLACKSTONE, supra note 21, at *294; then citing 2 HALE, supra note 23, at 124; and then
citing 2 HAWKINS, supra note 22, at 88 (3d ed. 1739)); Williams v. Dart, 967 F.3d 625, 634–
35 (7th Cir. 2020) (first citing 3 BLACKSTONE, supra note 21, at *290; then citing 4
BLACKSTONE, supra note 21, at *300; then citing 1 HALE, supra note 23, at 583–86, 589–
90; and then citing 2 HALE, supra note 23, at 77, 81, 95, 121).
25 Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 278 (1994) (Ginsburg, J., concurring).
26 See Understanding Surety Bond Costs, NNA SURETY, https://perma.cc/L246KMRL (quoting surety costs “between 1% and 15% of the bond amount” depending on
applicant’s “credit health”).
27 Wiseman, supra note 1, at 1352. Similarly, Yang asserts that “the practice of
money bail is premised on the idea that, by requiring defendants to post money, defendants have an increased incentive to abide by release conditions, such as appearing at trial.”
Yang, supra note 1, at 1472. Yang’s assertion may be more accurate because it is describing “money bail”—a practice that is very much at odds with the traditional approach of
bail and that did not flourish until the twentieth century. But even when such an incentive
story is limited to the modern practice of money bail, it is often inaccurate. Many defendants—especially poor defendants—do not post money bail themselves but instead use the
services of a bail bond agent, who typically collects a nonrefundable fee for becoming a
surety on the bond. Precisely because the bail bondsman’s fee is nonrefundable, the payment by the defendant “is a ‘sunk cost’ [that] should not affect the likelihood of the
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view of bail is, however, absolutely wrong as a matter of history.
The traditional law of bail emphatically barred defendants from
shouldering the financial risk of loss due to nonappearance.28 Rather, the defendant had to have sureties, and the sting of loss due
to the defendant’s nonappearance had to operate always on the
sureties, not on the defendant (who was barred even from contracting to indemnify the sureties for any loss). Thus, under the
traditional approach, bail was not designed to be a wealth-based
system, as defendants could not pay for their own bail. Our proposal for subsidizing bail sureties requires merely (i) reinvigorating the traditional view of bail as a surety relationship and
(ii) adding the slight tweak of having the government subsidize
the surety to the same extent that it is willing to subsidize the
“surety” of a jail.
The third stumbling block to modern readers is likely confusion about how subsidizing bail sureties would work and how it
differs from reducing bail amounts to more affordable levels. In
fact, the basics of the system are easy to explain. Consider a truly
destitute defendant for whom a court has set the bail bond
amount at $10,000 (approximately the current median amount
required).29 Lowering that bail amount to $1,000 or $500 may do
little to help the very poor, as multiple studies show that very
poor defendants often remain in jail despite bail being set as low
as a few hundred dollars.30
By contrast, under a bail system that is subsidized symmetrically vis-à-vis jail, the government would calculate the total expected costs of pretrial jail for such a defendant—a low estimate
would be $2,00031—and then be willing to pay that amount to any
bail agent willing to become the surety on a $10,000 bail bond
(i.e., willing to shoulder the financial risk of potentially paying
$10,000 if the defendant flees or otherwise violates the terms of
release). If multiple bail agents are willing to post the bond based
on the government’s opening offer for a subsidy (here, estimated

defendant’s appearance.” Ian Ayres & Joel Waldfogel, A Market Test for Race Discrimination in Bail Setting, 46 STAN. L. REV. 987, 989–90 (1994).
28 See infra Part II.A.
29 See Gold, supra note 1, at 504 (estimating the median bail amount at $10,000);
LIU ET AL., supra note 1, at 7 (estimating the median bail amount at $11,700 for felony
defendants in urban jurisdictions).
30 See, e.g., Yang supra note 1, at 1401 & n.6.
31 Forty days is a low estimate for the number of days that defendants spend in detention prior to trial, and $50 per day is a low estimate of the costs of jail. See supra note 7.
Forty days times the $50-per-day cost is $2,000.

1294

The University of Chicago Law Review

[88:6

at $2,000), the government would select the bail agent willing to
charge the least. If competitive bidding drives the price substantially below $2,000 (and that seems likely because, for defendants
with average flight risks, bail agents are often willing to charge a
fee of about 10% of the bond amount), the subsidized bail system
would save the government money over what it would have paid
to jail the defendant.
Fourth, some may misread our proposal as a subsidy for the
long-scorned commercial bail bond industry. Our argument requires competition among bail sureties, but it does not require
commercial bail sureties. Nonprofit bail funds and other charitable organizations could compete against one another to provide
surety services, just as many nonprofits vigorously compete to
provide educational or medical services.32 A government might
reasonably exclude commercial sureties if the government believed that those commercial entities had demonstrated records
of abusive practices. Or a government could subsidize bail generally and allow competitive forces to winnow which types of firms
are best at being good sureties. Provided that the government provides subsidies and permits competition between firms, this Article takes no particular position on whether the government
should limit its subsidies to sureties with particular types of institutional organizations.
Part III of this Article provides more details about the design
of a bail subsidy system, including discussion about why the cost
of incarceration provides an appropriate benchmark for the maximum size of the subsidy. For now, it is sufficient to note that,
under a wide variety of reasonable assumptions, bail subsidies
are highly likely to result in the release of many impecunious defendants who otherwise could not afford bail. Of course, not every
defendant will be released under a subsidized bail system. Defendants charged with very serious crimes and deemed high flight
risks by sureties may very well stay in jail, but that is as it should
be. Society should pay the high costs of jail in circumstances
where it is sensible to do so—but only in those circumstances.
This Article proceeds in four parts. Part I covers two important historical lessons. The first—that bail, traditionally
viewed, is a form of ongoing custody, albeit one more “friendly”
than jail—has already been mentioned. Reviving the traditional

32 See Henry B. Hansmann, The Role of Nonprofit Enterprise, 89 YALE L.J. 835 (1980)
(arguing that nonprofits are more appropriate for some markets).
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understanding of bail is an essential step in justifying bail subsidies and ending the modern bail crisis.
A second important lesson covered in Part I comes from the
history of the debtor prison reform movement. An analogy to debtors’ prisons has been drawn by both academic and political critics
of the current pretrial detention system including, among others,
former Governor Chris Christie, who prominently invoked the
analogy when leading the abolition of New Jersey’s constitutional
guarantee of bail.33 Prior academic literature, however, has done
little to explore this valuable analogy. As Part I shows, debtors’
prisons thrived in the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries
because the government was paying for the prisons. Reformers
successfully reduced debtor prison populations by equalizing the
government funding for debtor incarceration and debtor liberty
(zero for each). The broad lesson from that experience is that reformers should follow the money: if they perceive too much incarceration and too little liberty, reformers should make sure that
the public fisc is not asymmetrically funding the former over the
latter.
Part II covers the record of prior reforms, which should give
pause to all scholars (including us) who seek to improve the system. “Cash bail”—a “new approach” in the first half of the twentieth century but now very much in the crosshairs of the current
reformers—was designed to “reflect changed social conditions”
and was based on “a humanitarian interest in those accused persons who found themselves in foreign jurisdictions without helpful friends.”34 Yet that innovation made it easier to characterize
bail as a way for the wealthy to purchase their freedom and likely
weakened the policy case for the bail system. Other innovations
have also had negative consequences or have simply been far less
effective than had been hoped.
The current round of reforms has similar potential for unintended consequences. For example, it is not difficult to discern
how New Jersey’s abolition of a right to bail—a right described by
the Supreme Court as an essential bulwark to secure an accused’s

33 Editorial, Gov. Christie Takes on the Bail Bondsmen, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 14, 2014),
https://perma.cc/B382-2ZDA.
34 Note, Indemnification Contracts in the Law of Bail, 35 VA . L. R EV . 496, 503–
04 (1949).
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“presumption of innocence”35—could eventually have quite negative consequences for criminal defendants, even if that reform
was enacted with the opposite intention. Still, among the modern
reforms, we identify some reforms that point the way toward subsidized bail.
As previously mentioned, Part III provides details of how a
subsidized bail system would work. It addresses important issues
including whether a government should be willing to subsidize
bail more than jail or vice versa and whether bail subsidies should
be means tested. While these issues are important, the overarching thrust of this portion of the Article is that bail subsidies could
be implemented in a number of reasonable ways, each of which is
likely to be more economically efficient and socially desirable than
the current asymmetric system of extensive funding for jail but
not for bail.
Part IV provides a detailed legal and economic comparison
between our proposal of subsidizing private bail sureties and reforms like New Jersey’s that have government officers and agents
alone deciding which defendants to release and monitoring them
after release. That approach, frequently called a “pretrial services” approach, seems to be favored by prior reform-minded
scholars, public policy advocates, and lawmakers. The choice between our proposed system and the pretrial service model is not
one between a wealth-based and a risk-based system. It is instead
a choice between a system with some private checks on governmental action and a system dominated by governmental actors.
In analyzing that choice, we diverge from other commentators in
two fundamental ways.
First, from a legal perspective, we defend the basic conceptual notion underlying bail—which, at its core, does not rest on
some misguided principle that the rich should be able to buy their
way out of jail. No court or commentator has ever defended the
system on such grounds. Bail instead rests on the far more reasonable notions that (i) private sureties can help to ensure the
performance of obligations and (ii) private actors generally can
serve as a check against governmental overreach. Sureties are
widely used in public and private law settings. Bail—or, more accurately, the entire system associated with bail—is merely one
example of such a surety system. Reformers who seek the
35 Stack v. Boyle, 342 U.S. 1, 4 (1951) (“Unless this right to bail before trial is preserved, the presumption of innocence, secured only after centuries of struggle, would lose
its meaning.”).

2021]

Asymmetric Subsidies and the Bail Crisis

1297

abolition of bail rights (successfully, in the case of New Jersey)
are, in our view, motivated by a legitimate goal—eliminating excessive pretrial incarceration of the poor—but they fail to appreciate the value of a properly constructed private surety system as
a check on governmental decisions. Such a surety system has explicit textual recognition in a majority of state constitutions for
good reason; it should not be lightly cast aside.
Second, from an economic perspective, we see the choice between subsidized bail and government-run pretrial services as a
Coasean “make-or-buy” decision.36 The government needs certain
services—evaluating the riskiness of defendants, possibly monitoring them, and ensuring that they show up for trial. It can either make those services internally or buy them from outside entities such as bail agents. From that perspective, one of the widely
acknowledged truths in the debate over pretrial detention—the
extraordinary effect that the “rapid advance” in electronic and
computer technologies is having in the field37—cuts strongly in
favor of our proposal.
Even now, society’s options for pretrial restrictions on liberty
are not limited to jail, bail, or unconditional release. Rather, pretrial liberty restrictions exist on a spectrum ranging from jail
(complete detention) to so-called unconditional release (release
subject only to the single restriction on liberty that the defendant
must appear for certain court dates). Between those two poles lies
an increasingly diverse set of middle-ground options, including
(i) home detention enforced by electronic ankle bracelets, (ii) restricted release permitting substantial freedom but still including
some restrictions enforced by ankle bracelets or by GPS-enabled
smartphone technology, (iii) bail (conditional release with sureties), and (iv) combinations of various elements of those options.
Moreover, innovations in modern software, including artificial intelligence and machine learning algorithms, increasingly allow
computerized predictions concerning risks of flight and dangerousness that are more accurate and, quite possibly, less discriminatory than the guesstimates made in the past. Our proposal allows private innovation to continue flourishing in this middle
ground. The alternative cedes the field to governmental actors—
including judges, magistrates, and bureaucrats in the criminal
justice system—who, one might reasonably worry, could be less
36 See generally Steven Tadelis, Complexity, Flexibility, and the Make-or-Buy Decision, 92 AM. ECON. REV. 433 (2002).
37 Wiseman, supra note 1, at 1347.
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receptive to new technology and innovation than private actors in
an open and competitive marketplace would be.
Our focus on asymmetric subsidies also provides a general
framework for evaluating all options in this middle ground—
whether such options are governmentally or privately provided.
Curiously, while governments usually fund jail in its entirety,
they tend to be much stingier in subsidizing the middle-ground
options. For example, many governments permit pretrial release
with electronic ankle bracelets but require defendants to pay for the
bracelets. The predictable result is that impecunious defendants are
left incarcerated. To us, such a practice suffers from the same
skewed subsidies that afflict the bail system: society foots the bill
for the most draconian pretrial restriction on liberty (jail) but provides little or no subsidies for lesser restrictions on liberty. The
result is predictable. Society gets much more of the heavily subsidized option—incarceration. Our proposal—which calls for an
equalization of subsidies—provides the correct approach for analyzing the government’s general stance toward its financing of all
pretrial restraints on liberty.
I. HISTORICAL LESSONS FOR BAIL REFORM
Any reformer trying to change the present should start with
understanding the past. That’s especially true where the target
of reform is a centuries-old legal institution so cherished in the
past that it was enshrined in multiple constitutions. It’s even
more important in the case of bail, where the very meaning of the
word has changed with time.
This Article draws lessons from the history of both bail and
debtor prison reforms. First, as detailed in Part I.A below, the traditional view—the one held by Blackstone but old even in his
era—was that bail is a particular kind of surety system, a custodial suretyship more “friendly” than the four walls of a jail. That
view persisted in the late nineteenth century, with the Supreme
Court in 1873 describing bail as “a continuance of the original
imprisonment.”38
Paradoxically, recovering that traditional meaning of bail,
which might seem unfavorable to defendants, is a good first step
toward reform that is extremely favorable to defendants. After
all, if governments massively, and often completely, subsidize the
custody system known as jail, why then is it not just as
38

Taylor v. Taintor, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 366, 371 (1873).
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reasonable—indeed, more reasonable—for governments to subsidize the less costly and more socially desirable custody system
known as bail?
That’s not the only payoff from history. Modern political and
legal commentary has frequently analogized the current bail system to debtors’ prisons. That analogy is an apt one, but the modern scholarship has not delved deeply enough into the historical
record to recognize that, as detailed in Part I.B below, the debtor
prison–reform movement holds important lessons for modern bail
reform.
A. Blackstonian Bail: Custodial Suretyship
Blackstone described “the nature of bail” as “a delivery, or
bailment, of a person to his sureties, upon their giving (together
with himself) sufficient security for his appearance.”39 That description expressly denominates the bail agents as sureties, and
it also describes the release of the prisoner from jail not as freedom but as a delivery of the prisoner into the possession of the
sureties. Blackstone viewed “delivery” as synonymous with “bailment,” which even today denotes taking “possession” of the bailed
item.40 The prisoner, after his bailment to his sureties, was then
“supposed to continue in their friendly custody, instead of going
to gaol.”41
As that last passage suggests, Blackstone did not view jail as
much different than bail, both of which he described not only in
terms of custody but also in terms of suretyship. Unlike bail, jail
is not a surety system in a strict legal sense. Jail is just four walls.
Nevertheless, Blackstone viewed those walls as the ultimate
sureties. In describing the charges “of a very enormous nature” in
which bail was unavailable (e.g., murder), Blackstone explained
that, in such cases, “the public is entitled to demand nothing less
than the highest security that can be given; viz. the body of the
39 4 BLACKSTONE, supra note 21, at *294. Centuries before Blackstone’s era, the bail
sureties may have been subjected to the criminal punishments due to the prisoner—“body
for body”—if the prisoner did not appear for trial. A. ESMEIN, A HISTORY OF CONTINENTAL
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 69 & n.1 (1913). Yet, under English law long-established even two
hundred years ago, bail sureties in criminal cases were “not liable as in civil cases to stand
in the place of their principal, in the event of his non-appearance.” CHARLES PETERSDORFF,
A PRACTICAL TREATISE ON THE LAW OF BAIL IN CIVIL AND CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS 510
(London, J. Butterworth 1824).
40 See Bailment, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019) (describing “bailment” of
property as “a change in possession but not in title”).
41 4 BLACKSTONE, supra note 21, at *294.
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accused,” and so the accused was permitted to “have no other
sureties but the four walls of the prison.”42
Blackstone was not alone in his views. Earlier in the eighteenth century, the treatise writer William Hawkins (whom Blackstone cited) described the practice of bail as allowing a defendant
to select “Gaolers of his own choosing,” and, like Blackstone, he
saw bail and jail as close substitutes, with bail sureties being responsible for putting a bailed defendant “as much under the
Power of the Court as if he had been in the Custody of the proper
Officer.”43 Similarly, the seventeenth-century jurist Matthew
Hale described a bailed defendant as being “still in custody, and
the parties that take him to bail are in law his keepers.”44 As pithily
summarized by an early twentieth-century commentator, a defendant bailed under the traditional view could accurately say: “I
am out on bail; I am still in jail.”45
The concept of custodial suretyship was so important to the
traditional notion of bail that it was even reflected in ordinary
language. Two centuries ago, the noun “bail” itself referred to the
human sureties themselves—i.e., “[t]he person or persons who
procure the release of a prisoner from the custody of the officer
arresting him . . . by becoming surety for his appearance in
court”—as much or more than to the inanimate “security given
for the release.”46 Such meaning lasted throughout the nineteenth
century. The first edition of Black’s Law Dictionary, published in
1891, gave only one definition for the term “bail” in its noun form:
“The sureties who procure the release of a person under arrest,
by becoming responsible for his appearance at the time and place
designated.”47 The alternative meaning of “bail” as referring to the
money or securities provided upon release was mentioned only in
passing in the second paragraph of the definition for the verb form

42

Id. at *295.
2 HAWKINS, supra note 22, at 115; see also William F. Duker, The Right to Bail: A
Historical Inquiry, 42 ALB. L. REV. 33, 61 & n.152 (1977) (tracking Hawkins in describing
a bail surety as “a jailer of one’s own choosing”).
44 2 HALE, supra note 23, at 124.
45 James V. Hayes, Contracts to Indemnify Bail in Criminal Cases, 6 FORDHAM L.
REV. 387, 395 (1937).
46 Bail, WEBSTER’S DICTIONARY (1828) (respectively, the first and second meanings
listed). Webster cited language in Blackstone’s Commentaries—“[e]xcessive bail ought not
to be required”—as a usage example for the second meaning. That language dated back to
the 1689 English Bill of Rights, and similar language was later incorporated into the
Eighth Amendment. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
47 Bail, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (1st ed. 1891).
43
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of “bail.”48 As late as 1893, the noun “bail” in general parlance
referred more commonly to persons (those “act[ing] as surety for
a person under arrest”) than to things (“[t]he security or guarantee given”).49
All of this was much more than mere semantics. It had practical importance. Precisely because bail was so closely identified
with jail, “the bail” (i.e., the sureties) had continuing legal powers
over a released defendant. In the words of an 1824 treatise, “the
bail” held an “unrestricted authority over the person of the defendant,” including the power to “seize his person at any time (as
on a Sunday), or at any place, to carry him to a justice to find new
sureties.”50
That Blackstonian concept of bail was imported into the
United States. In defining “bail,” John Bouvier’s 1839 legal dictionary—generally recognized as the first U.S. legal dictionary51—parroted the above-quoted passages from Blackstone
nearly word for word, right down to describing the practice of bail
as placing prisoners into the “friendly custody” of their “sureties.”52 The Supreme Court also embraced this notion of bail—and
its implications—as is best shown by the 1873 case Taylor v.
Taintor.53
Taylor arose out of a bail bond executed by William Taylor as
surety to have a defendant released from a Connecticut jail. After
release, the defendant traveled to New York, was arrested, and
48 See id. (defining “bail” as a verb to mean “[t]o set at liberty a person arrested or
imprisoned, on security being taken for his appearance on a day and a place certain, which
security is called ‘bail.’”) (emphasis added)).
49 1 ISAAC K. FUNK, A STANDARD DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 154 (New
York, Funk & Wagnalls 1893) (respectively, the first and second definitions of “bail” as a
noun). Funk’s 1893 dictionary lists meanings based on frequency of usage. See id. at xi
(noting that “the most common meaning has been given first”). Other dictionaries do not
necessarily take that approach. See Thomas R. Lee & Stephen C. Mouritsen, Judging Ordinary Meaning, 127 YALE L.J. 788, 808–09, 808 n.89 (2018) (discussing the “sense-ranking fallacy” of assuming, without checking, that all dictionaries list meanings based on
frequency of usage).
50 PETERSDORFF, supra note 39, at 514–15; see also Ex p Gibbons (1747) 26 Eng. Rep.
153, 153; 1 Atk. Rep. 238, 238 (similar). The reference to arrests on Sundays is significant
because English law traditionally limited Sunday arrests to cases where “treason, felony
or breach of the peace.” Rollin M. Perkins, The Law of Arrest, 25 IOWA L. REV. 201, 247 &
n.306 (1940). Thus, bail sureties had powers arguably broader than government officers.
51 See Sarah Yates, Black’s Law Dictionary: The Making of an American Standard,
103 LAW LIBR. J. 175, 178 (2011) (recognizing Bouvier’s dictionary as “the first American
law dictionary”).
52 1 JOHN BOUVIER, A LAW DICTIONARY 113 (Philadelphia, T. & J.W. Johnson, 1st ed.
1839) (entry for “bail”).
53 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 366 (1873).
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was extradited to Maine, where he was tried, convicted, and imprisoned for a crime committed prior to the execution of the bail
bond in Connecticut.54 When the defendant failed to appear for his
trial in Connecticut (because he was imprisoned in Maine), the
Connecticut state treasurer sued Taylor to recover on the bail
bond.
Under settled law, the Supreme Court noted, “the bail” (again
referring to the surety—Taylor—who secured the defendant’s release) could be relieved of the bond obligation if the defendant’s
appearance for trial had been “rendered impossible.”55 Taylor argued that his situation fell into that category, but the Court disagreed. The Court reasoned that impossibility was not a defense
where the circumstances for the defendant’s nonappearance were
“created by the obligor.”56 The bail’s custodial control over the defendant was determinative on that point.
“When bail is given,” the defendant—or “the principal,” as the
Court wrote—“is regarded as delivered to the custody of his sureties” and “[t]heir dominion is a continuance of the original imprisonment.”57 To emphasize the point, the Court quoted colorful language from an early eighteenth-century English case declaring
that “[t]he bail have their principal on a string, and may pull the
string whenever they please, and render him in their discharge.”58
Because Taylor had such custodial powers, the Court viewed the
nonappearance at the Connecticut trial as his fault for the “imprudent” decision to allow the defendant to “go beyond the limits
of the State within which he is to answer,” which led to the defendant’s absence at trial.59
Such a traditional notion of bail as a custodial suretyship has
a double relevance to the thesis of this paper. First, precisely because bail and jail can be viewed as close substitutes, with bail a
“friendlier” option than jail, society should not prefer jail to bail.
Bail should be the rule, with jail limited to those exceptional situations where, as Blackstone said, “the public is entitled to demand nothing less than the highest security that can be given,”
54 See Taintor v. Taylor, 36 Conn. 242, 244 (1869) (noting that the Maine crime was
committed “before the giving of [Taylor’s] bail bond”).
55 Taylor, 83 U.S. at 369.
56 Id. at 370.
57 Id. at 371.
58 Id. at 371–72 (quoting Anonymous (1704) 87 Eng. Rep. 982, 982; 6 Mod. 231, 231).
59 Id. at 372. The Court noted that if Connecticut had extradited the defendant to
Maine, then the state would be responsible for the defendant’s absence, and the surety
“would have been released” from his bond. Id. at 373.
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and “no other sureties but the four walls of the prison” will suffice.60 That view is both deeply traditional and highly sensible.
The Blackstonian view of bail has another implication that is
even more relevant to our thesis and also distinguishes our thesis
from prior scholarship. If jail and bail are both custodial surety
systems, society should not provide vast subsidies to the former
and not the latter. Differential subsidies for jail and bail cannot
be justified on the theory that jail, unlike bail, is a form of custody,
which is inherently a governmental function and thus should be
paid for by the government. The two should be viewed as close
substitutes for each other with, in most cases, the same shared
goal of assuring the defendant’s appearance at trial.
Our argument against differential subsidies is more consistent with the practices of Blackstone’s era than modern readers might think. While the government of that time did not subsidize bail, it also did not subsidize jail. In the seventeenth and
eighteenth centuries, English jailers charged their detainees fees
for their own incarceration.61 So firm was that “defendant-pays”
policy that individuals too poor to pay their jail fees could be held
by their jailers even after they were acquitted of the charges that
justified the initial detention.62 It was not until 1774—five years
after the publication of Blackstone’s Commentaries—that Parliament began partially subsidizing jail by barring the continued detention of anyone acquitted of charges and paying jailers compensation for any fees lost from freeing the acquitted.63 General
abolition of jail fees, and accompanying public funding for jails,
came later.64 In sum, bail subsidies can be viewed as a return to a
tradition of symmetry, appropriately adjusted given the reality of
modern jail subsidies.
B. Lessons from Debtor Prison Reforms
Political, legal, popular, and academic discourse has repeatedly drawn an analogy between debtors’ prisons and incarceration resulting from an inability to post bail. As previously

60

4 BLACKSTONE, supra note 21, at *295.
See SIDNEY & BEATRICE WEBB, ENGLISH PRISONS UNDER LOCAL GOVERNMENT 5–
8 (1922).
62 Id. at 6.
63 See id. at 38.
64 See George Fisher, The Birth of the Prison Retold, 104 YALE L.J. 1235, 1259 &
n.106, 1263 (1995) (noting that abolition of jailer fees came a few years later with the work
of the magistrate Thomas Butterworth Bayley).
61
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mentioned, former Governor Christie drew the analogy in supporting changes to New Jersey constitutional and statutory law.65
Similarly, Senator Bernie Sanders, in a 2018 interview, described
the bail system in the United States as “outrageous . . . bring[ing]
us almost back to Charles Dickens’s era of the debtor jails where
people were in jail because they were poor.”66 The analogy has also
been drawn by Senator Cory Booker,67 the ACLU and other public
interest litigators,68 and several newspaper editorials.69 It has
even entered the academic literature on the subject.70
The analogy is, of course, imperfect. The solution ultimately
applied in the field of debtors’ prisons—the abolition of all incarceration in the field—is not even being proposed in the field of
pretrial incarceration. Nevertheless, the analogy is sufficiently
good that it is worth filling a significant gap in the prior literature, which has done little more than make the analogy at a high
level of generality. Even Professor Neil Sobol, who does the best
job of integrating the history of debtors’ prisons into the modern
literature on incarceration, limits himself to what he
65

See Phil Gregory, Praising Bipartisan Effort, Christie Signs N.J. Bail Overhaul,
WHYY PBS (Aug. 11, 2014), https://perma.cc/M8E2-6GMA (quoting Christie as saying
that “non-violent offenders who do not deserve to sit in what has become the equivalent of
debtors’ prison because they can’t afford to post the bail”).
66 Lauren Gambino & Ben Jacobs, Bernie Sanders’ Cash Bail Bill Seeks to End “Modern Day Debtors’ Prisons”, THE GUARDIAN (July 25, 2018), https://perma.cc/97EJ-3BZJ; see
also Sanders Introduces Bill to End Money Bail, BERNIE SANDERS, U.S. SENATOR FOR VT.
(July 25, 2018), https://perma.cc/J9VZ-BWGX (describing the jailing of people who “cannot
afford cash bail” as “a ‘debtor prison’ system”).
67 See Morgan Simon, Candidate Forum with Biden, Sanders, Trump, Warren Bears
Bad News for Private Prison & Bail Bond Industries, FORBES (Oct. 29, 2019),
https://perma.cc/398N-YQ2C (quoting Booker’s analogy between bail and debtors’ prisons).
68 Danny Wicentowski, Taking On Cash-Bail Policies, Missouri Supreme Court Aims
to End Debtors’ Prisons, RIVERFRONT TIMES (Jan. 31, 2019), https://perma.cc/Y6VA-LXDS
(describing litigation by the ACLU and another public interest group challenging the
“cash-bail system” as “creat[ing] unconstitutional systems of debtor’s prisons ”);
ACLU OF NEB., UNEQUAL JUSTICE: BAIL AND MODERN DAY DEBTORS’ PRISONS IN
NEBRASKA 4 (2016), https://perma.cc/EZC3-PHB4; Lorelei Laird, Court Systems Rethink
the Use of Financial Bail, Which Some Say Penalizes the Poor, A.B.A. J. (Apr. 1, 2016),
https://perma.cc/M7TF-QVL6 (reporting on another public interest litigator who describes
bail practices as leading to “debtors’ prisons”).
69 See, e.g., John Lantigua, Opinion, Florida Jails Serving as Debtors’ Prison,
TALLAHASSEE DEMOCRAT (Sept. 4, 2017), https://perma.cc/YJ6B-YE9E; Bruce Murphy,
Opinion, The Wisconsin Budget’s Private Bail Bond System Spells the Return of Debtors’
Prison, ISTHMUS (June 13, 2013), https://perma.cc/N5EW-3CVL.
70 See, e.g., Appleman, supra note 1, at 1316–17 (arguing that recent practices have
“transform[ed] pretrial detention into a modern-day debtor’s prison”); Neil L. Sobol,
Charging the Poor: Criminal Justice Debt and Modern-Day Debtors’ Prisons, 75 MD. L.
REV. 486, 502 (2016) (listing the costs and fees associated with bail as one reason that
current incarceration practices can result in de facto modern-day debtors’ prisons).
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acknowledges to be a “short” discussion of the U.S. history of
debtor prison reforms.71
Reconnecting the academic literature on bail to civil law topics such as debtor prison reform is especially appropriate because
much of the law on bail developed within the old processes of imprisonment for civil liabilities. Blackstone, for example, introduced the concept of bail in his third volume, devoted to “Private
Wrongs.”72 Instead of serving process, plaintiffs in Blackstone’s
era (and for a long time thereafter) could have defendants arrested even before obtaining a judgment, and defendants needed
bail to secure their release while awaiting the civil trial.73 In reintroducing bail in his fourth volume, on “Public Wrongs,”
Blackstone merely referred back to his discussion in the preceding book as having “shewn” the “nature of bail.”74 Given the close
historical connection between bail and the processes of incarceration for civil liabilities, debtor prison reforms are likely to be instructive. Three lessons are particularly relevant.
1. Protecting the poor.
Odd as it may sound, the law governing debtors’ prisons included substantial protections for the poorest of the poor. As far
back as the eighteenth century, most states granted debtors release from prison if they were not charged with fraud and they
either took an oath of poverty or assigned all of their estates to
their creditors. 75 As the law of Virginia was explained by
Thomas Jefferson (who knew a lot about debt), debtors who
“ma[de] faithful delivery of their whole effects, are released from
confinement, and their persons for ever discharged from restraint

71

Sobol, supra note 70, at 494–98.
3 BLACKSTONE, supra note 21, at *287–92.
73 See Richard Ford, Imprisonment for Debt, 25 MICH. L. REV. 24, 28–29, 34–39
(1926) (describing civil arrest in the 1920s); Eugene J. Morris & Hilton M. Wiener, Civil
Arrest: A Medieval Anachronism, 43 BROOK. L. REV. 383, 387–90 (1977) (describing laws
that allowed civil arrest for torts, such as fraud, as late as the 1970s).
74 4 BLACKSTONE, supra note 21, at *294. In his discussion of bail in criminal cases,
Blackstone devoted most of his discussion not to the nature of bail (which had been covered
in his book on private wrongs) but instead to the bail issue, unique to criminal law, of
which offenses were not bailable. See id. at *295–97.
75 See PRISON DISCIPLINE SOC’Y, FIFTH ANNUAL REPORT OF THE BOARD OF MANAGERS
OF THE PRISON DISCIPLINE SOCIETY 40–46 (Boston, Perkins & Marvin 1830) (summarizing
the laws of nine mid-Atlantic and New England states, all of which granted discharge from
debtors’ prison via an oath or assignment). For a proposal to adapt this oath of poverty to
modern bankruptcy, see Richard M. Hynes & Nathaniel Pattison, A Modern Poor Debtor’s
Oath, 108 VA. L. REV. (forthcoming 2022).
72
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from such previous debts.”76 While that price for freedom would
have been dear to the wealthy, it was cheap to the poor and free to
the destitute.
Recent political and legal commentators are therefore quite
wrong in asserting that current pretrial incarceration practice is
as bad as the old law governing debtors’ prison. It’s not; it’s worse.
Even legal systems willing to imprison individuals on the basis of
mere civil liabilities were still generally unwilling to waste resources imprisoning the very poor based merely on their poverty.
One last point deserves emphasis: while most state rules
protecting the poor from debtors’ prison were statutory, both
Pennsylvania and Vermont included the rule directly in their
state constitutions of the Revolutionary era.77 In each constitution, the relevant section contained only two sentences. The first
limited imprisonment for debt: “The person of a debtor, where
there is not a strong presumption of fraud, shall not be continued
in prison, after delivering up, bona fide, all his estate real and
personal, for the use of his creditors.”78 The second contained the
state’s constitutional guarantee of bail: “All prisoners shall be
bailable by sufficient sureties, unless for capital offences, when
the proof is evident or presumption great.”79 Those two constitutional guarantees appearing in the same clause is not an accident.
Both are united by a common purpose of limiting unjustifiable
incarceration.
2. Unbundling incarceration: “Liberty of the yard.”
A common recommendation of modern law and economics
scholarship on regulatory reform is that policymakers should at
least consider disaggregating, or “unbundling,” previously united
elements in goods, services, regulations, and even legal institutions. In the last half century, such unbundling was implemented
in energy80 and telecommunications81 regulation. Articles in

76 THOMAS JEFFERSON, NOTES ON THE STATE OF VIRGINIA 133 (William Peden ed.,
Univ. of N.C. Press 1954) (1787).
77 PA. CONST., art. II, § 28 (1776); VT. CONST., ch. 2, § XXV (1777).
78 PA. CONST., art. II, § 28 (1776); VT. CONST., ch. 2, § XXV (1777).
79 PA. CONST., art. II, § 28 (1776); see also VT. CONST., ch 2, § XXV (1777).
80 United Distrib. Cos. v. FERC, 88 F.3d 1105, 1126 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (describing regulations that required “mandatory unbundling of [natural gas] pipelines’ sales and transportation services”).
81 See AT&T Corp. v. Iowa Utils. Bd., 525 U.S. 366, 370–74 (1999) (recounting the
statutory and regulatory “unbundling” of telecommunications); see also Jerry A. Hausman
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prominent law journals have suggested unbundling as a new approach to, or tool for analyzing, legal and regulatory problems in
a host of fields including property rights,82 labor law,83 constitutional analysis,84 and criminal procedure.85
Unbundling is, of course, not a panacea, and sometimes regulatory regimes suffer from excess fragmentation rather than excessive unification.86 Nevertheless, the vast unbundling literature
demonstrates that policymakers should consider whether rights,
markets, and legal institutions might benefit from greater disaggregation or unbundling. Here we believe that both the old and
the new point toward unbundling pretrial incarceration. Let’s
start with the old.
While the phrase “debtors’ prison” might evoke images of
Dickensian dungeons filled with unspeakable privations, the actual conditions of U.S. debtors’ prisons did not necessarily match
those of the debtors’ prisons of fiction. Keeping a debtor locked up
twenty-four hours a day is not only socially costly but also counterproductive. Creditors seeking ultimate payment had little interest in preventing debtors from continuing to work to generate
income for satisfying debts. Thus, at least by the nineteenth century, most jurisdictions allowed debtors the liberty or privilege of
the jail “yard” or “limits,” which were expansively defined to include acres of land, entire towns, or often even the whole of the
county in which the jail was located.87 Such areas “stood as an
& J.G. Sidak, A Consumer-Welfare Approach to the Mandatory Unbundling of Telecommunications Networks, 109 YALE L.J. 417, 426–35 (1999).
82 See generally Nicole Stelle Garnett, Unbundling Homeownership: Regional Reforms from the Inside Out, 119 YALE L.J. 1750 (2010) (reviewing LEE ANNE FENNELL, THE
UNBOUNDED HOME: PROPERTY VALUES BEYOND PROPERTY LINES (2009)).
83 See generally Benjamin I. Sachs, The Unbundled Union: Politics Without Collective Bargaining, 123 YALE L.J. 1 (2013).
84 See generally Richard Primus, Unbundling Constitutionality, 80 U. CHI. L. REV.
1079 (2013); Christopher R. Berry & Jacob E. Gersen, The Unbundled Executive, 75 U.
CHI. L. REV. 1385 (2008).
85 See generally John Rappaport, Unbundling Criminal Trial Rights, 82 U. CHI. L.
REV. 181 (2015).
86 See, e.g., Michael A. Heller, The Tragedy of the Anticommons: Property in the Transition from Marx to Markets, 111 HARV. L. REV. 621, 679–80 (1998).
87 See Ford, supra note 73, at 37 (describing the liberty of “the yard of the jail, which
in legal contemplation is the county in which the jail stands”); Robert A. Feer, Imprisonment for Debt in Massachusetts Before 1800, 48 MISS. VALLEY HIST. REV. 252, 261 (1961)
(noting that, as of 1785, the “liberty of the yard” allowed debtors in one Massachusetts
prison to “roam about the center of the village” and that, by 1799, “the jail limits were
extended to the ground within a quarter-mile of the prison in all directions”); PRISON
DISCIPLINE SOC’Y, supra note 75, at 42 (describing an 1829 New Hampshire law extending
the prison yard to the “boundaries of the town where the prison is”). While some
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extension of the prison itself, but without the extreme constraints
of bars and bolts.”88 A debtor with yard privileges could go about
freely in such areas—and sometimes even further89—“follow[ing]
his occupation by day” and “return[ing] to his prison ‘apartment’
at night.”90 In later years, a nightly return to confinement was not
necessarily required.91 Yard privileges were thus an example of
what this Article’s Introduction termed the “middle-ground” custodial options, in which some elements of custody are coupled
with substantial liberty.
Again, the modern commentators drawing an analogy to
debtors’ prisons are missing the point that the current pretrial
incarceration of nonviolent offenders in prisonlike jails may be
significantly less enlightened than the law governing debtors’
prisons, which unbundled incarceration and kept only minimal
elements limiting liberty.
Now let’s turn to the new. Modern technology makes such unbundled, middle-ground options even easier than two hundred
years ago. A virtual jail “yard” can be expansively defined and
easily monitored through ankle bracelets (an older, twentiethcentury technology) or through more modern, less expensive technologies that use GPS-enabled cell phones coupled with facial
recognition software to monitor defendants automatically.92 With
such technologies, the jail “yard” into which a defendant could be
bailed can be exceedingly broad, and yet meticulously tailored.
Released defendants could be given the liberty of whole states or

jurisdictions required a bond to obtain the liberty of the yard, that requirement was not
uniform. See Edwin T. Randall, Imprisonment for Debt in America: Fact and Fiction, 39
MISS. VALLEY HIST. REV. 89, 93 n.16 (1952) (noting that Connecticut sheriffs were required
to grant liberty of the yard to all “who shall be in his custody, on civil process only”).
88 Gustav Peebles, Washing Away the Sins of Debt: The Nineteenth-Century Eradication of the Debtors’ Prison, 55 COMP. STUD. SOC’Y & HIST. 701, 710–20 (2013) (noting
that U.S. jurisdictions had expanded jail yards or “rules” to include whole towns and
counties).
89 Feer, supra note 87, at 261 (noting that “[s]ome prisoners who had the liberty of
the yard found that the sheriff did not keep a close eye on them and that they could move
about the town in which the prison was located and even go into adjoining towns with
impunity”).
90 PETER J. COLEMAN, DEBTORS AND CREDITORS IN AMERICA: INSOLVENCY,
IMPRISONMENT FOR DEBT, AND BANKRUPTCY, 1607 - 1900, at 41 (1974) (describing the practice in Massachusetts); see also id. at 87 (describing the same practice in Rhode Island).
91 Harold R. Medina, Shall New York Surrender Leadership in Procedural Reform?,
29 COLUM. L. REV. 158, 168 (1929) (noting that a debtor who obtained jail-limits privileges
could obtain “the freedom of the whole county in New York County, Kings County and
elsewhere” for up to “six months”).
92 See, e.g., U.S. Patent No. 10,008,099 (issued June 26, 2018).
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even the whole country, excepting particular areas (such as international airports or the residences of alleged victims) that might
increase flight risks or violate reasonable release conditions. Such
modern technologies make it even easier to unbundle pretrial custody, keeping only the “friendly custody” of bail sureties who can
maintain their principals on a virtual string at an extremely low
cost.
3. Ending asymmetric subsidies: Forcing creditors to pay.
The history of debtor prison reform has one last and, we believe, most important lesson for bail reform: reformers should
make sure that the public fisc is not subsidizing excessive restrictions on liberty.
One of the most important, and yet often overlooked, questions about debtors’ prison is: Who paid? Today, the jails and prisons of our criminal justice system, even private prisons, are generally paid for by the government.93 That was not necessarily the
case for debtors’ prisons, especially in some nineteenth-century
jurisdictions.
While debtors themselves were sometimes responsible for
their “food, fuel, and clothing,” which was “supplied from their
own resources, the generosity of family or friends, begging, or the
beneficence of a local relief society,”94 governments in the late
eighteenth century still paid for the capital costs of the jail and
for the labor of the jailers. That subsidy favored incarceration because the state was not then supporting (as it does today) noncustodial mechanisms to enforce debt repayment (e.g., by maintaining a registry of secured credit claims on personal property).
Moreover, because creditors were not charged even the maintenance costs associated with keeping debtors in prison, the creditor’s invocation of incarceration imposed substantial externalities
on those friends, relatives, and charities that helped maintain the
imprisoned.
Reformers in the nineteenth century discovered one powerful
tool for curbing debtors’ prisons—forcing creditors to pay the costs
of incarceration. In varying forms, that reform was applied in

93

See infra Part III.D.3 (discussing the exceptions to this rule).
BRUCE H. MANN, REPUBLIC OF DEBTORS: BANKRUPTCY IN THE AGE OF AMERICAN
INDEPENDENCE 87 (2002) (describing conditions around the time of the Founding).
94
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Delaware,95 Pennsylvania,96 Massachusetts,97 Rhode Island,98
Ohio,99 Tennessee,100 and Virginia.101 Overseas, such a “creditorpays” system was implemented in Scotland, although not in
England (even though English reformers pointed out that the
upkeep of the debtor-prisoners often costs more than the outstanding debt for which they were imprisoned).102
Some laws went even further in making sure that the creditors bore the full social cost of incarceration. Under the early nineteenth-century law of Delaware, if a debtor’s incarceration would
make his “family . . . become a public charge,” the creditor had to
“make provision for the support of such prisoner and family” or
else the prisoner would be freed.103 Such a law provides precedent
for a key objective of modern reformers, who legitimately argue
that government should consider the larger social costs of pretrial
detention in formulating incarceration policies.104

95

PRISON DISCIPLINE SOC’Y, supra note 75, at 45.
Id. at 46 (noting a Pennsylvania law providing that, for debtors unable to support
themselves, creditors had to give debtors an allowance of twenty cents per day for their
upkeep and that debtors could be released if the creditors did not pay the allowance).
97 Id. at 43 (noting a Massachusetts law allowing towns to recover the costs of supporting poor prisoners from creditors).
98 Id. at 44 (noting a Rhode Island law providing that debtors executing an oath attesting to their inability to pay a debt could be maintained in prison only if the creditors
paid $1 per week in advance to the jailer).
99 Gill v. Miner, 13 Ohio St. 182, 197–98 (1862) (noting Ohio laws requiring creditors
to pay jail fees “weekly in advance” and holding that, where a creditor has “resorted to the
extreme remedy of imprisonment” to collect a debt, the jailer has the right to discharge
the debtor if the creditor failed to pay the lawful jail fees).
100 Gale v. Snapp, 9 Tenn. (1 Yer.) 85, 86 (1825) (noting that, under an 1817 law,
creditors were bound every fifteen days to “pay the jailor the prison fees for the preceding
fifteen days” or else the jailer could discharge the prisoner). The discussion in Gale shows
that a 1796 statute required the jailer to feed the prisoner and that only in 1817 were
creditors required to reimburse jailers.
101 Zimmerman v. Buzzard’s Adm’rs, 4 Va. (2 Va. Cas.) 406, 406–07 (1824) (describing
an 1823 Virginia law that made creditors responsible for paying jail fees of imprisoned
creditors).
102 G.R. Rubin, Law, Poverty and Imprisonment for Debt, 1869-1914, in LAW,
ECONOMY AND SOCIETY, 1750–1914: ESSAYS IN THE HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 241, 251–
52, 252 n.22 (G.R. Rubin & David Sugarman eds., 1984). Scotland’s nineteenth-century
curtailment of government subsidies for debtors’ prisons might explain why Scotland was
able to abolish debtors’ prisons in 1880, ninety years before their final abolition in England. Without government subsidies, incarceration likely became a less attractive option
for creditors looking to collect on debts.
103 PRISON DISCIPLE SOC’Y, supra note 75, at 45 (emphasis added). Discharge from
debtors’ prison did not extinguish the debts. Subsequently obtained property would still
be attached, but the debtor was exempt from any further threat of imprisonment based on
such debts. Id.
104 See, e.g., Yang, supra note 1, at 1404.
96
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Eliminating government subsidies for debtors’ prisons appears to have been a very successful reform. Indeed, in the early
nineteenth century, some debtors’ prisons in Massachusetts saw
their population “diminished [by] one half” after the enactment of
a law “requiring the creditor to pay the board of the debtor.”105
The economic reason for that success is straightforward. As one
commentator from the early twentieth century noted, the thenexisting Michigan law requiring creditors to pay jail fees meant
that creditors had to make “a further investment in a bad debt
with only a gambling chance of ever recovering anything.”106 Such
an investment was so unattractive that the “ordinary [legal] practitioner” found “little advantage” in seeking to imprison a client’s
debtors.107
The appropriate theoretical lesson to be drawn from this history is that governments should not asymmetrically subsidize incarceration over alternatives that preserve more liberty. In the
field of debtors’ prisons, the government achieved that goal by
withdrawing all subsidies from incarceration.
In the field of pretrial detention, the government cannot eliminate all subsidies for incarceration (some defendants should be
jailed), but it can at least eliminate the asymmetric subsidy between jail and its more “friendly” cousin, bail. Indeed, if society
were to favor subsidizing one over the other, the favored option
should almost certainly be bail and not, as is currently the case,
jail.

105

PRISON DISCIPLINE SOC’Y, FOURTH ANNUAL REPORT OF THE BOARD OF MANAGERS
see also Matthew
J. Baker, Metin Cosgel & Thomas J. Miceli, Debtors’ Prisons in America: An Economic
Analysis, 84 J. ECON. BEHAV. & ORG. 216, 220 (2012) (recognizing that one nineteenthcentury jurisdiction noted a “roughly one-third” drop in the number of imprisoned debtors
once the law held “the creditor responsible for jailing fees”); COLEMAN, supra note 90, at
86 (discussing a 1718 Rhode Island law requiring creditors “to pay sixpence a day in jail
fees and to supply debtors with sufficient work to support themselves”); id. at 251 (noting
that Massachusetts and Connecticut also obliged creditors “to pay jail fees and support
costs”). Not every state imposed such costs on creditors. See MANN, supra note 94, at 80–
81 (noting that the states differed in their “statutory mechanisms for freeing imprisoned
debtors” and recognizing differences as to “who was responsible for maintaining [debtors]
in prison”).
106 Ford, supra note 73, at 47. Michigan’s law also provided that if a creditor stopped
paying, the debt judgment would be deemed “satisfied.” Id.
107 Id. Even into the twentieth century, however, England continued to pay for debtors’ prisons even where custody cost more than the debt. See Stephen J. Ware, A 20th
Century Debate About Imprisonment for Debt, 54 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 351, 369 (2014).
OF THE PRISON DISCIPLINE SOCIETY 17 (Boston, Perkins & Marvin 1829);
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II. PRIOR BAIL REFORMS
The bail system has undergone extensive changes during the
last century and a half, and many current proposals for reform
are in fact very old. For example, a 1927 academic study of the
then-existing bail system in Chicago made recommendations
such as (i) “a general reduction in the amount of bail,” (ii) “extended use of the recognizance without sureties,” and (iii) the judicial employment of various “expert[ ]” services “to facilitate an
intelligent exercise of the [courts’] wide discretionary powers”
concerning pretrial detention and release.108 All of these remain
standard suggestions among modern reformers, although the expert services recommended now might use artificial (not human)
intelligence.
Yet the history of reform is not one of constancy in the face of
repeated suggestions for the same reforms. Most significantly, the
twentieth century saw a transformation from the older notion of
bail as custodial suretyship toward a notion of bail as simply a
price that defendants must pay for their freedom. As recounted in
Parts II.A and II.B below, two Supreme Court decisions—decided
fifty-nine years apart and quite transparent about the ongoing
changes in bail—provide good windows into distinct eras during
the overall transformation. Each era had its Cassandra—an unheeded jurist who warned about the negative consequences of the
changes supported by the reformers of the day.
The history here is intended to demonstrate two points. First,
current reformers’ characterization of bail as a wealth-based or
resource-based system is clearly not the traditional conception of
bail. At best, and to the extent the current practices can be viewed
as selling pretrial freedom, those practices developed only in the
twentieth century. A second lesson is that good intentions are not
enough to produce good legal reforms. The reformers of earlier
eras believed that their reforms would make pretrial release easier to obtain and more accessible to the poor, but they may have
made matters worse.
Part II.C outlines some of the new reforms currently being
introduced in our era and highlights two of them, each of which
addresses what in our view is the crucial issue: the funding of
measures granting pretrial release. Each of those contains at
least the glimmerings of what Part III of this Article proposes in
detail: subsidization for bail sureties.
108

BEELEY, supra note 20, at 167.
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A. Cash Bail and the Shift to Financial Suretyship
In the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, the traditional custodial nature of bail was dramatically de-emphasized.
The intellectual flashpoint illustrating the change was the rather
technical matter concerning whether a defendant’s contract to indemnify a bail for any losses due to his nonappearance was void
as contrary to public policy. The traditional rule had been that
such indemnity agreements were void. As an 1855 English decision explained, an indemnity agreement was void because “it
would be in effect giving the security of one person only, instead
of two.”109
In 1884, that very passage was quoted by the Supreme Court
to explain why it refused to imply a right of action by bail sureties
against their principal (i.e., the defendant) to recover losses on a
forfeited bail bond, even though sureties generally do have such
implied rights.110 The traditional rule meant that sureties retained incentives to perform their sorting and monitoring functions (deciding which defendants were trustworthy enough for release and keeping track of them after release). As a
contemporaneous English case explained, a bail surety protected
by an indemnity agreement would have “no interest in taking care
that the condition of the recognisance is performed.”111 Even as
late as 1891, the federal circuit court for the Southern District of
New York invoked similar reasoning in refusing to accept as bail
two sureties whom the defendant agreed to indemnify.112 “Bail,”
the court reasoned (referring to the human sureties), “become in
law the custodians of the prisoner for the court,” and the “court
looks to their vigilance to secure the attendance and prevent the
absconding of the [defendant].”113 The indemnity agreement undermined that purpose because “[w]hen persons offering themselves as bail have entered into a contract of indemnity with the
accused, they have endeavored to relieve themselves of responsibility for him.”114

109
110

Jones v. Orchard (1855) 139 Eng. Rep. 900, 904; 16 C.B. 614, 624.
United States v. Ryder, 110 U.S. 729, 735 (1884) (quoting Orchard, 139 Eng. Rep.

at 904).
111

Herman v. Jeuchner [1885] 15 QBD 561, 563; see also Earl C. Arnold, Indemnity
Contracts and the Statute of Frauds, 9 MINN. L. REV. 401, 409–10 (1924) (collecting cases
on the public policy objections against agreements to indemnify bail sureties).
112 United States v. Simmons, 47 F. 575, 577 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1891).
113 Id. at 577.
114 Id.
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That traditional rule made less sense once defendants could
dispense with sureties by posting purely cash bail. A watershed
was the New York case Maloney v. Nelson,115 which permitted enforcement of an indemnity contract between two bail sureties.116
The indemnity agreement was offered by one bail surety to induce
another to become the second surety117 for a prisoner who later
absconded. The second surety sued to collect the agreed-upon indemnity and prevailed in the lower courts.
While reversing on procedural grounds, the New York Court
of Appeals commented in dicta that “the claim that the [indemnity] contract . . . was void, as against public policy, does not impress us as being a good defense, at least in this state.”118 After
the second surety again prevailed at trial in enforcing the indemnity agreement, the intermediate appellate court supplied more
reasoning. The validity of such contracts, the court reasoned,
could be “inferred” from the legislature’s allowance of bail not only
“by sureties in the old manner, but also by the deposit of money
by the accused.”119 That comparatively new method of bail—by
“deposit of money by the accused”—demonstrated that the bail
system “need not depend upon the personal responsibility of the
surety.”120
Two points are worth noting here. The first is the effect of
New York’s cash bail statute. While that statute dated back to
1850,121 the use of cash bail was nonetheless not common in the
last decade of the nineteenth century. Neighboring jurisdictions
had only recently authorized the practice (e.g., Massachusetts in
1881) or would not do so until several years later (New Jersey in
1898;122 Connecticut in 1909;123 and Pennsylvania in 1919124).
Moreover, in the underlying criminal litigation that gave rise to
Maloney, the court did not permit bail by cash deposit but instead
demanded not just one but two sureties. Even the appellate court
in Maloney itself recognized cash bail as fundamentally new, a
115

39 N.E. 82 (N.Y. 1894), on remand, 12 A.D. 545 (N.Y. App. Div. 1896).
See Maloney, 39 N.E. at 83.
117 The trial court in the criminal case demanded two bail sureties, which was not
uncommon at the time. See Maloney, 12 A.D. at 546 (noting that “it was necessary to procure another surety” to secure the criminal defendant’s release).
118 Maloney, 39 N.E. at 84.
119 Maloney, 12 A.D. at 548–49.
120 Id.
121 N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW pt. 4, tit. 11, ch. 1, art. 5, § 648 (1850).
122 1898 N.J. Laws 875.
123 1909 Conn. Pub. Acts 1006.
124 1919 Pa. Laws 102, § 2.
116
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change from the “old manner” of bail “by sureties.”125 Yet the mere
existence of New York’s statute gave the courts a justification for
holding indemnity agreements enforceable in that state.
The second point to note here is the tremendous significance
of the seemingly technical issue of indemnification. Even in jurisdictions with legislative authorization for cash bail, courts still
had to be willing to accept it rather than by sureties of the “old
manner.” As the underlying case in Maloney shows, some courts
were not so willing. Indemnification agreements gave defendants
a convenient way to turn a traditional bail relationship into a de
facto cash bail. Defendants could simply agree to indemnify their
sureties—even giving them collateral up-front if necessary—for
any potential losses due to their position as sureties. The sureties
would then, as English courts correctly surmised, become indifferent to whether the defendant appeared at trial. The sureties
became mere window dressing, and defendants could put themselves into the same position economically as if they had deposited money with the court through a cash bail system.
The controversy over bail indemnification ultimately
reached the Supreme Court in 1912. In an opinion by Justice
Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., the Court in Leary v. United States126
sided with New York’s approach.127 Leary grew out of a massive
criminal fraud involving U.S. contracts. Leary posted a bail bond
for one defendant in the criminal case, and the bond was forfeited
when the defendant absconded. Leary had been promised indemnity from railroad stocks held in trust by a third party, and she
sought to collect that indemnity. The United States, however, also
had a claim of ownership to the stocks, and it argued (inter alia)
that Leary’s claim was invalid because the indemnity agreement
was void as against public policy.
Justice Holmes dispatched the public policy argument with
his typical panache and historical insight. The government’s position, succinctly summarized by Justice Holmes, was that the
bail contemplated by federal statutory law was “common-law bail
and that nothing should be done to diminish the interest of the
bail in producing the body of his principal.”128 Yet the very nature
of bail had changed, Justice Holmes thought, with the “distinction

125
126
127
128

Maloney, 12 A.D. at 549.
224 U.S. 567 (1912).
Id. at 576.
Id. at 575.
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between bail and suretyship [being] pretty nearly forgotten.”129 To
Justice Holmes, the obligation to assure the defendant’s appearance in court was “impersonal and wholly pecuniary.”130 The bond
“sum was the measure of the interest on anybody’s part [in the
defendant’s appearance], and it did not matter to the Government
what person ultimately felt the loss so long as it had the obligation it was content to take.”131 For good measure, Justice Holmes
cited New York’s Maloney decision and described it as “founded
in good sense.”132
Such a conception of bail radically de-emphasized the role of
sureties in deciding whether defendants were trustworthy
enough to be released and in monitoring them after release. Commentators in the first half of the twentieth century understood
the significance of the shift. Looking back on earlier cases, one
1937 law review article recognized that, under that “old notion of
bail” where a prisoner would be released only “to one who will
have a personal and property interest in producing him for trial
and thus be his jailer,” an indemnity agreement was sensibly declared contrary to public policy since it “eliminat[ed the bail’s] interest in producing the prisoner.”133 Under the modern notion
“where a prisoner may secure his release by means of a mere cash
or property deposit,” the opposite was true because “the state has
made clear that it is its policy not to rely on any supposed jailer
but on the mere cash and property itself.”134
The change even had an effect in the language used in describing bail. As previously mentioned, the most common meaning of the noun “bail” at the end of the nineteenth century was not
things but people—bail meant the human sureties who took
charge of the defendant. Half a century later, a legal commentator
recognized that the very word “bail” had undergone “a verbal metamorphosis” as it even then meant “the bond which is given and
no longer [ ] the sureties (persons) who are bound.”135
The shift was controversial. Some observers welcomed the
change on the grounds that “altered social conditions” inevitably
129

Id.
Id.
131 Leary, 224 U.S. at 575–76.
132 Id. at 576.
133 Hayes, supra note 45, at 404.
134 Id. The author of that article decried the change in the law and presciently predicted that the change could lead to a system in which bail was viewed as a way in which
the rich were able to buy their way out of jail. Id. at 406–07.
135 George F. Longsdorf, Is Bail a Rich Man’s Privilege?, 7 F.R.D. 309, 310 (1947).
130
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“made bail impersonal.”136 Another recommended that judges
should be more willing to accept “cash . . . as security” in releasing
defendants.137 Yet going against the trend were doubters warning
that “[n]ot everything new is better,” and that “[p]erhaps our forefathers were wiser in their generation than we are in ours” given
the absence of evidence demonstrating the “older” system
“worked any great injustice.”138
Among judicial opinions, the best dissent from the dominant trend came from West Virginia Supreme Court Justice Ira
Robinson, who openly worried that the new approach would allow
rich defendants to “buy [their] freedom from answering the law”—a
result “never contemplated” in the law on bail.139 Justice Robinson
argued that the traditional system allowed “[t]he poorest man, if
honest, [to] find bail.”140 Even if that assessment was unduly optimistic, Justice Robinson sounds prescient in warning that the
new approach was “open[ing] the door to barter freedom from the
law for money.”141 Yet that dissent was generally unheeded. Justice
Holmes’s views carried the era.
B. Bail as the “Price” for Freedom
In Justice Holmes’s time, the distinction between bail and
suretyship had been lost. Today, even the analogy between bail
and suretyship seems to be largely forgotten, with bail now being
viewed as a “price” for pretrial freedom.
Hints of the change could be seen even in the decade immediately following Justice Holmes’s opinion in Leary. For example,
a 1927 academic study described defendants’ inability to obtain
release from pretrial detention as due to their being “too poor to
purchase [their] freedom pending trial.”142 That perspective on
bail—i.e., viewing the system as a way to purchase pretrial freedom—lent itself naturally to reform recommendations such as
“reducing the amount of the bond” and granting release on “personal recognizance.”143 In other words, if bail is viewed as a price
for freedom and society believes too many defendants are being

136
137
138
139
140
141
142
143

Note, Current Legislation: Criminal Bail Bonds, 21 COLUM. L. REV. 592, 594 (1921).
BEELEY, supra note 20, at 167.
Hayes, supra note 45, at 406–07.
Carr v. Davis, 64 W. Va. 522, 535 (1908) (Robinson, J., dissenting).
Id.
Id.
BEELEY, supra note 20, at 157.
Id. at 46.
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incarcerated before trial, the most natural solution is to lower
the price of freedom, or even to set it at zero (release on personal
recognizance).
The view of bail as a way to purchase freedom was ultimately
reflected in the 1971 Supreme Court decision Schilb v. Kuebel,144
which explicitly described bail as the “price for [the defendant’s]
pretrial freedom.”145 The Schilb case arose as a constitutional
challenge to an Illinois bail reform law that (i) eliminated private
sureties for bail and instead (ii) required any defendant seeking
pretrial freedom to execute a bond for the full bail amount, with
that bond secured by depositing in cash 10% of the total bond
amount with the clerk of the court.146 Defendants who appeared
for trial received a refund of 90% of the cash deposit, with the
other 10% of the cash (1% of the bond amount) being retained by
the court, purportedly to cover administrative costs.
The plaintiff in the case, who had appeared for his trial for
certain traffic offenses and therefore received 90% of his case deposit back, sued the state for the return of the other 10% (on his
own behalf and, to make the suit worthwhile, on behalf of the
class of those similarly situated). The case reached the Supreme
Court on the basis of the plaintiff’s federal due process and equal
protection challenges to the system, but a 6–3 Court majority rejected those challenges.
Writing for the Court, Justice Harry Blackmun’s opinion began by noting the “paradoxical” nature of the challenge to the new
system.147 The plaintiff’s bail had been set at $750 (about $5,400
in 2020 dollars).148 He was released after depositing $75, and after
his appearance at trial, he received back all but $7.50 (about $54
in current dollars). The plaintiff was better off under the new system, Justice Blackmun explained, because under the old system
bail bond agents typically charged a fee equal to 10% of the bond
amount, and so the “premium price for his pretrial freedom”
would have been an “irretrievable” $75.149 Under the new system,
“the cost of Schilb’s pretrial freedom . . . was only $7.50.”150 Justice
144

404 U.S. 357 (1971).
Id. at 366.
146 See id. at 360–62.
147 Id. at 366.
148 See id. The Department of Labor’s “inflation calculator” converts $750 from 1969
(the time of the plaintiff’s arrest) into $5,401.45 in 2020 dollars. See CPI Inflation Calculator, BUREAU OF LAB. STAT., https://perma.cc/4LKT-3F5X.
149 Schilb, 404 U.S. at 366.
150 Id.
145
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Blackmun thus characterized Schilb’s position as being that “the
legislation must be struck down because it does not reform
enough.”151 Obviously, from that perspective, the plaintiff’s challenges were doomed.
For purposes of this Article, the Court’s conception of bail is
more important than the outcome in the case. To the Court, bail
was all about a price for freedom, and if judges did not respond to
the reform by raising total bail amounts (a significant assumption), then the Illinois system was likely beneficial on net to criminal defendants by reducing the cost of pretrial freedom.
That perspective also explains another feature of the opinion:
the extreme hostility to “the professional bail bondsman system,”
which the Court described as being “in full and odorous bloom in
Illinois,” “with all its abuses” prior to the reform.152 Eliminating
that “offensive situation” had been “[o]ne of the stated purposes”
of the Illinois reform,153 and the Court obviously thought the extermination of bail bond agents was highly desirable. Demonizing
bail bondsmen was deeply consistent with the changed notion of
bail. Bail bondsmen are, of course, the most common sureties of
the modern bail system, but, as bail came to be viewed merely
as a price placed upon pretrial freedom, the surety aspect of the
older system was viewed not merely as outdated but as downright “offensive.”
For Illinois’s reform, Justice William Douglas played the role
of Cassandra. He too had no love for the “commercial bail bondsman,” whom he described as “ha[ving] long been an anathema to
the criminal defendant seeking to exercise his right to pretrial
release”154 (an odd claim, since defendants seek out bail agents to
arrange release from detention imposed by courts). But Justice
Douglas’s dislike of bail agents did not prevent him from seeing
the ominous change in the Illinois reform: the government’s withholding of 10% of the cash deposit (1% of the bond amount) applied even to “acquitted defendants.”155
Though Illinois defended the imposition of the fee on the
grounds that it was necessary to administer the new system,
Justice Douglas saw that such an expense, once it is being
charged by the government, becomes “as much an element of the
151
152
153
154
155

Id.
Id. at 359.
Id. at 360.
Schilb, 404 U.S. at 373 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
Id. at 378.
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costs of conducting criminal cases as the prosecutor’s salary, the
fee for docketing an appeal, or the per diem paid to jurors.” 156 In
Justice Douglas’s view, imposing on acquitted defendants any of
those costs—any of the government’s costs of running the criminal justice system—violated “the most rudimentary concept of
due process.”157
Justice Douglas’s views went unheeded, and the Illinois system remains in place today.158 From the perspective of this Article,
the Illinois reform—though undoubtedly motivated by good intentions—was another step in the wrong direction. Illinois’s system
now overtly charges defendants for their freedom. Previously,
Illinois may have been asymmetrically subsidizing jail over bail,
but at least it was not charging a toll for leaving jail—i.e., affirmatively raising government revenue from criminal defendants,
guilty and innocent alike.
C. Embryonic Development of Symmetric Subsidies
In contrast to Sections A and B, this part of the Article details
two positive developments in the law of bail—ones that are particularly useful for setting the stage for Part III of the Article,
which presents a proposed bail subsidy system in detail.
The first development came recently in the Arizona Supreme
Court decision Hiskett v. Lambert,159 which involved what this Article’s Introduction described as the increasingly diverse middle
ground between jail and unconditional release.160 The trial court
in the case initially exercised one of the middle-ground options: it
allowed release of the defendant conditioned on his “wear[ing] a
GPS monitoring device . . . and [being] responsible for all costs
associated with it.”161 These costs were substantial—$150 down
and about $400 per month.162
After paying for the device for about four months, the defendant claimed that he could no longer afford to do so and asked
the court to shift the costs to the county. The relevant statute
156

Id.
Id. at 377.
158 New Illinois legislation enacted in 2021 has scheduled the abolition of the current
bail system for around January 1, 2023. SAFE-T Act, Pub. Act 101-0652, § 110-1.5 (Feb.
22, 2021) (amending 730 ILCS 5/3-14-1). The future Illinois system authorized in the new
legislation is a variation on New Jersey’s approach, discussed in Part IV, infra.
159 451 P.3d 408 (Ariz. 2019).
160 See id. at 412–13.
161 Id. at 410.
162 Id.
157
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authorized release with electronic monitoring where that technology was “available,” but it was silent as to who should pay for the
monitoring. Because the county was unable or unwilling to pay
the costs, the trial court held that electronic monitoring was unavailable. The court then asked the defendant to post a bail bond
to remain out of jail. When the defendant failed to do so, he was
incarcerated.
The Arizona Supreme Court reversed. In deciding that the
county should pay the monitoring costs, the court relied on an
earlier case that prohibited a lower court from imposing DNA
testing fees upon a convicted felon. Quoting its earlier reasoning
that “if the legislature wanted convicted felons to pay the cost of
mandatory DNA testing, ‘we presume it would say so expressly
as it has done so in other statutes,’” the court ruled that “the same
reasoning applies here—and with greater force—where Petitioner is accused of certain crimes but has not yet been tried,
much less convicted.”163
As a matter of policy, we think the court reached the right
result. Two other points are noteworthy, with the first being the
lack of opposition to the outcome. The county took no position in
the matter, and Arizona’s attorney general argued that the
county should bear the costs and that other counties were already
doing so.164 A second point is a mere question posed by the procedural history of the case: If monitoring had been unavailable and
the trial court had required a bail bond as security, why should
the government not subsidize that middle-ground option too? As
the facts of the case demonstrate, bail and monitoring are substitutes. If the government is subsidizing one, the case for subsidizing both is strong.
A second embryonic form of subsidized bail comes not from a
new court decision or governmental policy but from private innovation that, in part, already demonstrates an emerging reality of
subsidized bail. In the last several years, a number of charitable
organizations have been started to post bail for defendants, with
the most notable of these new organizations being the Bail Project.165 These charities have adopted simple, innovative strategies
to get defendants to appear for court dates (e.g., providing phone
163 Id. at 412. The court left open whether a separate statute might authorize imposing pretrial monitoring fees retroactively on those who are ultimately convicted at trial.
Id. at 412 n.4.
164 Hiskett, 451 P.3d at 412–13, 413 n.5.
165 See, e.g., BAIL PROJECT, https://perma.cc/6BQD-SWT4.
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reminders and transportation to court), and they have achieved
excellent results in performing that task (which is the traditional
task of bail sureties).166
Two points are worth noting. First, some of these charities
are currently a form of government-subsidized bail, albeit only
partially so. The Bail Project and others are organized as 501(c)(3)
organizations so that their donors can deduct donations from taxable income.167 For donations from donors sufficiently wealthy to
itemize their taxes, the implicit “tax subsidy” caused by the deductibility of the donations may be 40% or more.168 Indeed, at least
one city, New York, has gone a step further and actually contributed tax dollars to help establish and run a bail fund. In that instance, the city funds are used only for administrative costs; the
actual money used to post bail comes from donations.169 Still, such
precedents show that the ideas in this Article are near to reality
today and, perhaps with the theoretical basis detailed herein,
could be reality tomorrow.
Second, while the leading academic article on these innovative funds is entitled Bail Nullification,170 the funds might be better viewed as a form of “bail rejuvenation.” The funds do precisely
what bail sureties should do (and traditionally did do): they
screen defendants to make sure they are good risks,171 they maintain contact to help assure court appearances,172 and they are
closely tied to the defendants’ communities.173 As Professor Jocelyn
Simonson has recognized, such bail funds “hark[ ] back to the

166 See Simonson, supra note 1, at 603 (noting such strategies); id. at 607 (noting 90%–
95% appearance rates).
167 See, e.g., FAQ, BAIL PROJECT, https://perma.cc/73JS-EB7N; Donate, CHI. CMTY.
BOND FUND, https://perma.cc/JK7L-CWJ4.
168 For high-earning taxpayers in New York City, the implicit tax subsidy could approach 50% given that the top federal, state, and city tax rates are, respectively, 37%,
8.82%, and 3.876%. See SMARTASSET, https://perma.cc/Z2U3-W3LU.
169 See Teresa Matthew, Why New York City Created Its Own Fund to Bail People Out
of Jail, BLOOMBERG CITYLAB (Dec. 1, 2017), https://perma.cc/4QY5-VCMN (noting that
the “$1 million from the city council pays for overhead costs like staff and rent” of the
Liberty Fund, while the fund “relies on money from a private donor for the bail costs”); see
also An Overview, LIBERTY FUND, https://perma.cc/87LZ-SNHA (describing the funds as
“New York City’s first city-wide charitable bail fund, founded in partnership with [a
named private philanthropist]”). To be clear, our subsidization method, as detailed in
Part III below, envisions not direct government funding of particular bail organizations
but instead a competitive bidding process open to all bail sureties.
170 Simonson, supra note 1.
171 See id. at 603 (noting the different decision-making processes of the funds).
172 See id. (discussing the involvement of the funds in assuring appearances).
173 See id. at 604 (noting the origin of the funds in local communities).
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origins of bail.”174 They could be improved in one way: subsidization drawn from the immense resources currently being (wastefully) devoted to jail. To that process of subsidization, we now
turn.
III. BAIL SUBSIDIES IN DETAIL
This Article’s overarching thesis is that society should not
asymmetrically fund jail over bail and, as a corollary, that the
unavoidability of public support for jail (which is sometimes necessary) justifies public subsidies for bail sureties. This part of the
Article focuses on precisely how such a bail subsidy system would
work. The overarching goal is to construct a system capable of
harnessing competition between bail agents to prevent excessive
incarceration.
The first question is: What is the maximum price that the
government should be willing to pay for bail as a substitute for
jail? Even under the assumption that bail has no net social benefits vis-à-vis jail (including no benefits even to bailed defendants),
that question yields a surprisingly high answer: the government
should be willing to pay a price for bail—i.e., to subsidize bail—
up to the expected cost for jail. In other words, if the government
were soliciting bids to serve as bail sureties for individual defendants, the maximum price that the government would be willing
to pay would be the cost of jail. Of course, competition among bidders should drive that amount downward if, as real-world data
suggest, bail is typically much less expensive than jail.
Part III.A below explains this basic result and shows why, if
it sets the amount of the bail bond correctly, the government can
remain indifferent among various bail technologies and strategies
and simply solicit bids for surety services and then purchase the
services from the lowest bidder. Part III.B extends the analysis to
demonstrate that subsidized bail can provide an easily administered check against irrational government decisions to jail defendants when it would be less socially costly simply to release
them.175
174

Id. at 611.
Many commentators have argued that governments are, in fact, jailing many impecunious defendants even when the social costs of releasing them would be lower than
the costs of jailing them. See LIU ET AL., supra note 1, at 14 (comparing the decreased
likelihood of crime pretrial and failure to appear with the costs to detainees and society
and ultimately concluding that “28 percent fewer defendants could be detained pretrial
without significant risk to the public, thereby generating substantial net social benefits”);
175
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Parts III.C and III.D provide a more general analysis of, respectively, the optimal bail bond amount and the maximum subsidy that the government should be willing to provide to a bail
surety for accepting liability in that amount. In general, the bond
amount should be set at the full social costs that will occur if the
defendant violates the terms of release, not the risk that such a
violation will occur. The bond amount should also not be discounted for impoverished defendants if bail subsidies exist.
In setting the maximum subsidy, the government should
raise the subsidy above its own costs for jail if, as a growing body
of empirical research suggests, incarceration imposes social costs
in addition to the mere cost of operating the jail.176 The government may also want to lower its maximum allowable subsidy for
wealthier defendants—i.e., means test the subsidy—although we
argue that a government might rationally provide a full subsidy
for all defendants who are ultimately acquitted at trial.
Part III.E discusses how the government should consider
bids from potential sureties and, in particular, how the government should allow the defendant’s preferences for particular bail
agents to factor into determining the winner. Finally, Part III.F
responds to an objection regarding how agency costs affect our
proposal.
In reading the following sections, it is important to remember
that the typical costs of jail are quite high—conservatively estimated in the range of $50 to $100 per day.177 If pretrial detention
lasts several weeks (as is common),178 the total cost of jailing a
defendant can easily run into the multiple thousands of dollars.
If the government sets its maximum subsidy at that level, many
Yang, supra note 1, at 1436 (comparing private and social costs and benefits to conclude
that “pre-trial detention may generate net welfare losses due to the over-detention of marginal defendants”).
176 See, e.g., Heaton et al., supra note 1, at 767 (finding that pretrial “detention increases the share of defendants charged with new misdemeanors by 9.7% as of eighteen
months post-hearing” and increases the likelihood of new felony charges by 32.2% over the
same period); Leslie & Pope, supra note 3, at 550 (finding that “[p]retrial detention increases the probability of being rearrested within 2 years by 7.5 percentage points for the
felony subsample and by 11.8 percentage points for the misdemeanor subsample”).
177 PRETRIAL JUST. INST., supra note 7, at 1–2 (concluding that pretrial detention costs
“may be conservatively estimated at $85 a day” if “fixed building expenses” are excluded,
but also noting that the costs of detaining a person in New York Rikers Island jail have
been estimated at “about $460 per day”).
178 THOMAS H. COHEN & BRIAN A. REAVES, BUREAU OF JUST. STAT., SPECIAL REPORT:
STATE COURT PROCESSING STATISTICS, 1990–2004, at 7 (2007) (“Released defendants
waited a median of 127 days from time of arrest until adjudication, nearly 3 times as long
as those who were detained (45 days).”).
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poor defendants would likely get bail. Moreover, competitive bidding would often drive the price lower than the maximum that
the government was willing to pay—saving the government
money as compared to jail and releasing a large number of defendants who otherwise would remain incarcerated based only on
their inability to pay for bail.
A. Setting the Maximum Bail Price at the Cost of Jail
To determine the maximum price that the government
should be willing to pay for bail, we begin by assuming that the
government has three pretrial options for defendants: (i) jail,
(ii) bail, or (iii) release without restrictions (excepting the restriction that the defendant must appear at trial). Assume, for
now, that the government bears all the social costs associated
with release and jail and that those costs are the following:
Release: Releasing the defendant has no immediate cost, but
25% of defendants will fail to appear for trial. For each of those
25% of defendants, the government must spend $10,000 to find
and bring the defendant to trial.
Jail: Jailing a defendant costs $2,000, on average, from arrest
to trial ($50 per day for 40 days) but eliminates the risk of nonappearance for trial.179
TABLE 1: EXPECTED COST OF RELEASE VERSUS JAIL
A

B

C

D

Cost to Find and
Average Cost
Rate of
Average Cost Average Cost
Bring Defendant
of Precautions Failure to
Due to Failures
to Secure
Option
to Trial After
to Ensure
Appear
to Appear
Appearance
Failure to
Appearance
for Trial
=B×C
=A+D
Appear
Release

$0

25%

$10,000

$2,500

$2,500

Jail

$2,000

0%

$10,000

$0

$2,000

Under these assumptions, and without bail as an option, a
rational government will choose to jail defendants because the average cost of getting defendants to trial (last column of Table 1) is
less using jail ($2,000) than release ($2,500).
Now assume that the government pays a bail surety as an
alternative to jail. How much should it be willing to pay to the

179 For simplicity, we do not include the (negligible) present-value adjustment to the
jail costs.
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surety? The first obvious answer is: “Certainly no more than
$2,000.” That answer is clearly correct because the government
can achieve its goal of bringing all defendants to trial for an average cost of $2,000. But should the government be willing to pay
even that much?
1. Jail vs. “perfect” bail.
Let’s first consider the easy case where bail, like jail, leads to
100% of defendants appearing at trial (e.g., where the hypothetical bail surety can perfectly predict which defendants would appear for trial and offer bail only for them). It’s easy to see then
that the government should be willing to pay up to $2,000 because
bail is a perfect substitute for jail.
2. Jail vs. “imperfect” bail.
Now let’s consider the much more realistic case of an “imperfect” bail system in which 15% of the bailed defendants fail to
show up for trial, and the government must spend $10,000 to locate and bring to trial each of those defendants. Should the government be willing to pay the bail surety up to $2,000 even though
bail is not nearly as good as jail at securing the defendant’s appearance at trial?
Surprisingly, the answer is “yes”—given two crucial conditions: (i) the government sets the bail bond amount equal to
$10,000 (the cost to the government of recapturing an absconding
defendant)180 and (ii) the government collects the forfeited bond in
every case of nonappearance.181 To see this, consider the costs to
the government of such an imperfect bail system that satisfies
those two conditions:
180 See, e.g., Ayres & Waldfogel, supra note 27, at 996 (“In essence, these bond dealers
sell the state ‘flight insurance.’”).
181 Although many jurisdictions now require bail agents to be backed by qualified insurance companies so that forfeitures are paid, bail critics have argued for nearly a century that governments often fail to collect forfeited bonds. See, e.g., BEELEY, supra note
20, at 54. Some apparent collection failures may be due to grace periods that excuse forfeitures where sureties quickly deliver defendants to courts. See Mary A. Toborg, Anthony
M.J. Yezer, Tamara Hatfield, Rebecca L. Fillinger, Katherine H. Shouldice & B. Lynn
Carpenter, Commercial Bail Bonding: How It Works, NAT’L INST. OF JUST. 21 (1986),
https://perma.cc/T5B3-T2FP. Governments could also maintain an expected recovery of
$10,000 by increasing the bond amount. For example, if governments collect only half of
the time, they can set the bond at $20,000. Finally, if governments are unable to perform
a basic task like collecting forfeitures, we see little reason to entrust them with more complex tasks such as running pretrial services programs that are currently being proposed
as replacements for bail. See infra Part IV.
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TABLE 2: EXPECTED COST OF BAIL
A

B

C

Cost to Find and
Initial
Rate of
Bring Defendant
Cost of Failure to
to Trial After
Bail
Appear for
Failure to
Contract
Trial
Appear
$2,000

15%

$10,000

D
Amount
Forfeited in
Cases of
Failure to
Appear
$10,000

E
Average Cost
Average
Due to
Cost for
Failures to Defendant’s
Appear
Appearance
= B × (C – D)
=A+E
$0

$2,000

Under these assumptions, the government should be willing
to pay up to $2,000 for the bail contract because the costs of nonappearance are canceled out by the bail agent’s forfeitures to the
government. Note also that an initial intuition—that the government should be willing to pay less for an imperfect bail system
than for a perfect one—is not wrong. Though the government is
paying $2,000 in upfront costs on both the perfect and imperfect
bail contracts, the perfect bail agent gets to keep all $2,000 (because there are no forfeitures) while the imperfect bail agent
keeps only an average of $500 on each $2,000 bail contract (because, on average, the imperfect bail agent forfeits 15% of
$10,000—or $1,500—on each contract due to nonappearance).
Thus, the government ultimately does pay less to imperfect bail
agents, but, if the bond amount is set correctly, the government
should be willing to pay the same amount up front.
3. Considering bids from differing bail agents.
This insight—that the government should be willing to pay
up to the full cost of jail (i.e., the full $2,000) as the up-front cost
of a bail contract, whether perfect or imperfect—is also a crucial
point for understanding why a rational government can choose
between bids from competing bail agents each of which may be
using different technologies. Consider four competing bail agents,
each of which is using a different technology to sort and monitor
defendants:
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TABLE 3: EXPECTED COST OF DIFFERENT BAIL AGENTS
A

B

C

D

E

Bail
Agent

Cost to Find
Rate of
Amount Average Cost
Initial
and Bring
Failure to
Forfeited
Due to
Cost of
Defendant to
Appear
in Cases of Failure to
Bail
Trial After
for Trial
Failure to
Appear
Contract
Failure to
Appear = B × (C – D)
Appear

Perfect

$2,000

0%

$10,000

$10,000

$0

$2,000

Very
Good

$2,000

5%

$10,000

$10,000

$0

$2,000

Good

$2,000

10%

$10,000

$10,000

$0

$2,000

Fair

$2,000

15%

$10,000

$10,000

$0

$2,000

Average
Cost for
Defendant’s
Appearance
=A+E

Because the bond amount is set to equal the government’s
costs for nonappearance, the government can be indifferent between the bond agents, announce that it will pay a price as high
as $2,000, and reward the contract to the lowest bidder.
Which bidder will prevail? Although the government is indifferent between the four hypothetical bidders, each bidder will realize different amounts of profit from a bail contract depending
upon (i) the costs of the bidder’s technology and (ii) the forfeitures
it has to pay the government due to nonappearance. Thus, if the
government were to start the bidding at $2,000, the four bidders
would calculate the following profits on a $2,000 contract if each
has the sorting and monitoring costs shown in column B:
TABLE 4: EXPECTED PROFIT FOR DIFFERENT BAIL AGENTS
A

Bail
Agent

Perfect
Very
Good
Good
Fair

B

C

D

E

Average
Bail
Average Costs
Amount
Cost to Bail Agent’s
Reservation for Technology Rate of
Forfeited
Agent Due Profit on a
Price for Bail to Sort and Failure to in Cases of
to Failures
$2,000
Contract
Monitor
Appear Failure to
to Appear
Contract
Defendants
Appear
=C×D
= A – B –E
$2,000
$1,900
0%
$10,000
$0
$100
$2,000

$1,200

5%

$10,000

$500

$300

$2,000
$2,000

$500
$300

10%
15%

$10,000
$10,000

$1,000
$1,500

$500
$200

If the government starts the bidding at $2,000, all four bail
agents will be willing to accept such a contract. As the bidding
progresses downward, the perfect bail agent is going to stop bidding at $1,900 because its expensive technology means it would
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lose money on any bid below $1,900. The next bidder to drop out
will be the agent with fair technology. Its costs are very low
($300), but it has such a high average expected forfeiture on each
contract ($1,500) that it would lose money on any contract less
than $1,800. The final bidder to drop out will be the one with very
good technology. It has low expected forfeitures ($500) but relatively high technology costs ($1,200). It will not bid on any contract less than $1,700. The bail agent with good technology will
win the bidding at some price incrementally below $1,700—let’s
say $1,699. The government will be better off by $301 because the
average cost for getting a defendant to trial will have dropped
from $2,000 (the cost of jail) to $1,699 (the cost of bail). The bail
agent will be better off because it will realize a $199 profit. Society
will be better off by the full $500, which represents the decrease
in real resources being expended, on average, to get each defendant
to trial.
4. “Cream skimming” is a solution, not a problem.
One final note addresses the so-called cream-skimming effect, which can be a problem when private businesses compete
with a governmental entity obligated to provide general service
even where the private entities are unwilling to do so.
The basic intuition is that the private firms will serve the
customers who are easiest to serve, and then the governmental
entity will be left with especially high costs. One standard solution is to prohibit private firms from competing. A classic example
is the U.S. Postal Service’s statutory monopoly on private letter
carriage, which was enacted “to prevent private mail services
from ‘cream-skimming’ the most profitable mail services by undercutting the U.S. Postal Service on low cost, high-profit routes,
thereby leaving the Service with less revenue to fulfill the requirement of providing service throughout the nation at uniform
rates.”182 Such examples are common, and the problem can extend to situations where a regulated entity has a universal service obligation.183
Cream skimming may seem like a potential problem with
bail, with private bail companies providing “friendly custody” to
182 American Postal Workers Union v. U.S. Postal Serv., 891 F.2d 304, 310 (D.C. Cir.
1989), rev’d on other grounds, 498 U.S. 517 (1991).
183 See, e.g., Kleenwell Biohazard Waste v. Nelson, 48 F.3d 391, 399–401 (9th Cir.
1995) (upholding the validity of regulations designed to prevent “cream-skimming” by unregulated entities in the medical waste disposal industry).
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those least likely to flee and the governmental custodian (the jail)
left with the greater flight risks. Yet cream skimming is exactly
what the government wants to encourage through bail. Any bail
system—including the current, unsubsidized bail system—is designed to get low-risk defendants out of jail. In other words, it is
designed to encourage cream skimming. Because jail is such an
expensive and burdensome option, the government wants to use
that option only for those posing the greatest pretrial social costs
(the greatest risk of flight or of some other pretrial violation of
law). Allowing bail to cream skim the lesser risks fundamentally
does not harm the government because it (i) decreases the government’s costs for bailed defendants and (ii) does not increase
the government’s costs for jailed defendants.
Thus, bail agents are socially desirable even if they are good
only at sorting defendants (finding the ones least likely to flee or
otherwise to violate their release conditions) and not at all good
at monitoring defendants. In short, if bail agents are good at
cream skimming (as private entities tend to be), that’s a solution,
not a problem.
B. Subsidized Bail as a Check on Excessive Jail
In Section A, we considered a situation in which an efficiencyminded government should jail defendants rather than release
them when jail and unconditional release were the only two options. We then considered how the government should solicit bids
for bail services and demonstrated that the government’s reservation price—the maximum price the government should be willing to pay for bail—should equal the costs of jail. In this part, we
demonstrate that the very same approach will work even if jail
costs more than release and the government is irrationally incarcerating defendants.
For this part, assume that the cost of jail is $3,000 rather
than $2,000. That is, assume all the costs hypothesized in Section A are the same except that the per diem cost of jail is $75
rather than $50 (thus raising the total cost for 40 days of jail to
$3,000). The table of costs for bail and jail is thus:
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TABLE 5: REVISED EXPECTED COST OF RELEASE VERSUS JAIL
A

B

C

D

Cost to Find and
Average Cost
Rate of
Average Cost Average Cost
Bring Defendant
of Precautions Failure to
Due to Failures
to Secure
Option
to Trial After
to Ensure
Appear
to Appear
Appearance
Failure to
Appearance
for Trial
=B×C
=A+D
Appear
Release

$0

25%

$10,000

$2,500

$2,500

Jail

$3,000

0%

$10,000

$0

$3,000

Under these assumptions, the government should release rather than jail defendants, but what if (as the evidence suggests
and as many commentators believe) it does not release them?
Would the strategy developed in Section A—awarding the contract to the lowest bidder so long as this bid is below the price of
jail—still work? The short answer here is “yes.” Indeed, that
strategy produces efficient results even if bail agents are able to
do nothing in terms of sorting or monitoring defendants.
To see this point, assume that the government announces
that it is willing to pay up to $3,000 for a bail bond of $10,000 that
will be forfeited to the government if the defendant fails to appear
at trial. Even “do-nothing” bail agents who have no technology to
sort and monitor defendants would accept the contract at that
price: they will take the $3,000, immediately release the defendants, and then pay the government $10,000 in the 25% of
cases where the defendant fails to appear for trial. The do-nothing
bail agents would realize $500 in profit on the transaction. Moreover, the do-nothing agents would still be serving a socially valuable function, for they would be saving society $500 in resources
spent on excessive jail. An economist would say that the bail
transaction was Pareto optimal—the government is no worse off
(it still is spending $3,000), the bailed defendant is no worse off
(likely better off), and the bail agent pockets a $500 profit. Society
as a whole is better off by $500.
Realistically, one would expect that there would be more than
one such do-nothing bail agent—after all, it’s not a hard job. Competition among multiple do-nothing bail agents would bid the contract price down to a level just slightly above $2,500 (the slight
amount above would be necessary to cover the transaction costs
associated with the bidding process). Again, an economist would
say that the transaction was Pareto optimal—the government is
better off (it would spend only a small amount above $2,500), the
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bailed defendant is no worse off, and the do-nothing bail agent
perhaps realizes a small profit. Society as a whole would be better
off by nearly $500 (specifically, $500 minus the transaction costs
of the bidding process).
The key result is that the bidding is a check on excessive jail.
Competition among bail agents produces the result that the government itself should have reached—unconditional release of defendants. In effect, the competition harnesses market forces to
prevent excessive incarceration. True, there will be some transaction costs associated with the bidding process, but those costs are
serving the socially valuable function of ensuring that the government is not wasting money on excessive incarceration.
Furthermore, if some of the bail agents discussed in Section A
are available—i.e., bail agents with sorting or monitoring technology capable of reducing the nonappearance rate of bailed defendants—then those bail agents will underbid the do-nothing
agents. The result would then be an even greater social benefit
than that detailed in Section A. For example, if the bail agent
with “good” sorting and monitoring technology submitted a bid,
the result would be a social savings of $1,000 compared to unrestricted release of defendants and a full $1,500 in savings as compared to irrationally excessive incarceration.
That last point suggests that the government may want to
subsidize bail for some defendants even if it knows that it would
not jail all of those defendants. If the government realizes that
the social cost of jail ($3,000) exceeds the average social cost of
simply releasing a particular group of defendants ($2,500) it may
nonetheless want to see whether bail agents could still further
lower costs. If the government subsidized bail and received a bid
from the bail agents hypothesized in Section A, the bail agent
with the good technology would still prevail with a winning bid
just under $1700. If that bail agent’s technology actually reduced
the likelihood of nonappearance (in other words, it was not just a
sorting technology),184 society as a whole would be better off by
$1,000 (not counting, of course, any transaction costs of the bidding process). The bail agent would profit just under $200 (as it

184

The “friendly custody” of bail could reduce the nonappearance rate by sending reminders about mandatory court appearances, by providing transportation to the court, or
even by monitoring the defendant’s location and sending a guard to escort the defendant
to the court appearance. Even sorting alone could improve welfare as it identifies higherrisk defendants for whom costly government incarceration may be justified. See infra
Part III.C.2.
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did in the hypothetical in Section A), and the government would
be better off by a bit more than $800 as it sees its average costs
for getting a defendant to trial declining from $2,500 to just under
$1,700.
C. Setting the Right Bail Bond Amount
In the prior sections, we assumed that defendants cost the
government $10,000 each when they failed to appear and that
such cost was the only cost imposed on society by released defendants. Under those assumptions, the government should set
the bail bond amount equal to $10,000 and award the bail contract to the lowest bidder.
The more general condition would be to have the government
set the bond amount at the total social costs caused by a defendant
violating the terms of release. If, for example, the average cost of
recapturing a fleeing defendant is $10,000 but third parties suffer
an average additional cost of $1,000 due to the recapture efforts
(e.g., costs such as the disruption caused when the government
agents execute search warrants on homes and businesses), then
the government should set the bond at $11,000. This result holds
true even if the government does not compensate those third parties for their losses.
The key result here is that the government must set the bond
high enough that the bond agent bears the full social costs of the
defendant’s violations of the terms of release. Such a strategy ensures that the government can select the lowest bidder and remain indifferent to whether the winning bidder (i) spends more
on technology to prevent violations, and thus less on forfeitures
due to violations, or (ii) spends less on technology and more on
forfeitures. If the bond amount is set so that the bail agent covers
the full social costs of the defendant’s violations of the terms of
release, then the bidding is a mechanism to find the bail agent
who, as the lowest bidder, minimizes the social costs of release.
1. Considering poverty.
For a subsidized bail system, judges should not allow a defendant’s poverty to be a factor militating in favor of reducing the
bond amount. Rather, judges setting bail bond amounts should
ask the straightforward question: How costly will it be if this defendant violates the terms of release? The judge should view the
subsidy system as counterbalancing the defendant’s poverty and
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thus should not reduce the bond below the social costs of the
violation.
Eliminating “poverty discounts” on the bond amount is important because too low of a bail bond could lead to rational but
inefficient actions by the bail agent. For example, assume that the
defendant’s flight would impose $10,000 in social costs but that a
judge reduces the bail bond amount to $1,000 on the grounds that
the defendant is too poor to afford a $10,000 bond. If bail agents
estimate the defendant’s flight risk at 10%, they will be willing to
accept the bail contract for merely $100.
Now assume that a monitoring technology costing $75 would
reduce the defendant’s flight risk from 10% to 4%. Clearly, it
would be socially efficient to use the technology because it decreases social costs by $600 (the avoided 6% in flight risk times
the $10,000 cost for each flight). The bond agent would employ
the technology if she were liable $10,000 for each flight: her private benefit from the technology would be $600, and her private
cost would be $75. If, however, the bond agent is liable for only
$1,000 for the defendant’s flight, her private benefit from the
technology would be only $60, which is insufficient to justify the
technology’s $75 cost. The bond agent will rationally forgo the
technology, but that’s inefficient from a social perspective.
Eliminating any discount to bail based on poverty may seem
to be a significant change from current practices, but it is in fact
just a modest adjustment to account for the presence of the governmental subsidy. In most states, statutory law or case law requires judges to consider the defendant’s “financial resources” in
setting bail.185 The existence of bail subsidies is merely a new “financial resource” available to defendants, and considering it
thusly is not so much a change to current practice as it is a different result due to the subsidy.186
In practice, the existence of the subsidy will make the task of
setting bail easier, not harder, for trial judges and magistrates.
While there is generally no constitutional right to affordable

185 E.g., VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-121 (2021) (requiring consideration of the defendant’s
“financial resources” in setting bail); FLA. STAT. § 903.046 (2020) (same); 725 ILL. COMP.
STAT. 5/110-5(a) (2020) (same); see also, e.g., N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 510.30(1)(f) (Consol.
2020) (same); Brangan v. Commonwealth, 477 Mass. 691, 697–98 (2017) (requiring consideration of the “defendant’s financial resources . . . as a matter of common law”).
186 Adoption of the subsidy system would not require any change in the current practice of requiring much larger bonds or even substantial cash deposits from the very
wealthy.
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bail,187 current law in some states and some federal circuits requires, as a matter of due process, that defendants be afforded
more procedural protections if bail is to be set at an amount unaffordable to that particular defendant.188 Such situations of unaffordable bail will arise far less frequently under a system that
provides subsidies up to the cost of jail. As previously discussed,
even a low estimate for the per-day cost of detention ($50) multiplied by the likely number of days for pretrial detention (weeks
for some crimes, and months for serious felonies) will produce
hundreds or even thousands of dollars as the maximum subsidy
that the government should be willing to pay for a bail surety. If
a defendant’s risk of flight is low or even moderate, such amounts
should induce bail agents to be sureties on the bail bonds in the
amounts typically ordered under current practice. Moreover, if bail
agents are willing to accept such subsidies to be sureties on bonds
generally but are unwilling to do so for a particular defendant, the
courts would then have good evidence that the defendant’s inability to obtain release is due to riskiness, not poverty.
2. Considering dangerousness.
The full social costs of release may, however, include not
merely the costs of flight but also the costs of additional pretrial
crimes. Back even in the time of Blackstone, governments refused
to release on bail defendants who reached a certain high degree
of dangerousness.189 A subsidized bail system need not change
187 See United States v. McConnell, 842 F.2d 105, 107 (5th Cir. 1988) (collecting
cases); Brangan, 477 Mass. at 702 (concluding that “a defendant is not constitutionally
entitled to an affordable bail”).
188 See, e.g., Brangan, 477 Mass. at 705:

[W]here a judge sets bail in an amount so far beyond a defendant’s ability to pay
that it is likely to result in long-term pretrial detention, it is the functional equivalent of an order for pretrial detention, and the judge’s decision must be evaluated in light of the same due process requirements applicable to such a deprivation of liberty.
See also State ex rel. Torrez v. Whitaker, 410 P.3d 201, 219 (N.M. 2018) (similar);
Valdez-Jimenez v. Eighth Jud. Dist. Ct. in and for Cnty. of Clark, 460 P.3d 976, 987
(Nev. 2020) (holding that “when bail is set in an amount that results in continued detention,” due process requires substantial procedural protections, including proof “by clear
and convincing evidence that no less restrictive alternative will satisfy [the government’s]
interests in ensuring the defendant’s presence and the community’s safety”); United
States v. Mantecon-Zayas, 949 F.2d 548, 550 (1st Cir. 1991) (similar); Mayson, supra note
6, at 1658–60 (collecting authorities).
189 See, e.g., Mayson, supra note 1, at 502 (noting that “[c]apital defendants have been
excluded from bail since colonial days” and that “there is some evidence that this exclusion
was a public-safety measure” but also that there is some “evidence to the contrary”).
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that traditional (and sensible) limit on bail. But what about defendants of only moderate dangerousness? A defendant charged
with robbery or with simple assault would be eligible for bail in
most jurisdictions, yet many such defendants may pose some substantial risk of committing new crimes during their release period. Should the bail bond (or some portion of it) for such a defendant be set to cover the social costs of additional crimes and
then be forfeited if such crimes occur?
Traditionally, bail bonds have been subject to forfeiture only
where the defendant fails to appear for trial.190 However, there is
strong evidence that courts have long considered the risk of additional crime—i.e., the defendant’s dangerousness—when setting
bail amounts.191 During the 1970s and 1980s, reforms in many jurisdictions expressly endorsed that practice.192 Still, state bail systems continue to vary as to whether defendant’s dangerousness is
considered in setting bail bond amounts and whether subsequent
arrests or crimes trigger bail forfeitures.193
The variation in state practice reflects the difficulty of the issue. From the perspective of economic efficiency, bail forfeitures
for other pretrial crimes would, in the words of Professors Ian
190 See, e.g., Lauryn P. Gouldin, Disentangling Flight Risk from Dangerousness, 2016
BYU L. REV. 837, 864 (noting that many jurisdictions still condition bail forfeitures solely
“on a failure to appear, not on the commission of a new offense” and that such an approach
is “consistent with a long history that makes clear that money bail is a tool for managing
flight risk, not a legitimate means of managing danger”); Curtis E.A. Karnow, Setting Bail
for Public Safety, 13 BERKELEY J. CRIM. L. 1, 6–7 (2008) (explaining that the Bail Reform
Act of 1984’s legislative history “demonstrated that Congress knew it was changing the
fundamental premise of bail, which theretofore had been designed only to ensure appearance at trial, to now also prevent dangerous criminals from re-offending while their cases
were pending”); Mayson, supra note 1, at 502 (noting that, with the exception of defendants charged in capital crimes, “U.S. pretrial law was at least purportedly centered
on ensuring appearance until the 1960s, when the system underwent a profound shift”).
191 See William M. Landes, Legality and Reality: Some Evidence on Criminal Procedure, 3 J. LEGAL STUD. 287, 288 (1974) (“Our empirical analysis reveals that [the hypothesis judges use the bail process as a means of preventing future crimes by defendants] is
more consistent with actual behavior [than the hypothesis that they use bail to ensure the
defendant’s appearance at trial].”).
192 See Gouldin, supra note 190, at 848 (observing that dangerousness was already
used by judges to make decisions about pretrial release and that, “[b]eginning in the 1970s
and 1980s, Congress and most state legislatures, amended or rewrote bail statutes to
adapt to what had been happening at bail hearings for decades”); see also, e.g., Karnow,
supra note 190, at 6 (noting that, in the second half of the twentieth century, “the law
changed at both the federal and state levels to allow judges at bail hearings to consider
the potential danger posed by the defendant’s release to the community”).
193 For a discussion of which states allow forfeiture for crime, see Rebecca Pirius, Pretrial Release Violations & Bail Forfeiture, NAT’L CONF. OF STATE LEGISLATURES (June 28,
2018), https://perma.cc/U9M6-T2X9.
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Ayres and Joel Waldfogel, give bail agents “a greater interest in
deterring pretrial misconduct” and thus “more fully price” the social costs of releasing a defendant on bail.194 On the other hand,
governments generally do not incarcerate individuals merely due
to their risk of committing future crimes. Thus, some commentators, such as Professor Sandra Mayson, have argued on normative
grounds against “subjecting defendants to preventive restraint
that we would not tolerate for equally dangerous people not accused of any crime.”195 That normative objection applies even outside the context of bail decisions, as states abolishing bail must
also decide how to consider whether to release dangerous defendants, what conditions to impose on release, and what to do if
those conditions are violated.196
A subsidized bail system is compatible with either an economic approach that considers dangerousness or a normative approach that does not. If a state is willing to consider dangerousness in its release decisions, it could consider the costs of those
crimes when setting bond amounts and impose corresponding
bond forfeitures if defendants commit the crimes. Subsidizing bail
up to the cost of jail would then accomplish one important goal
articulated in this Article: it would ensure that any imposition of
jail was cost justified (or, equivalently, that low-risk defendants
were bailed rather than jailed).
Alternatively, if a state has normative concerns about jailing
defendants based merely on relatively low probability risks (risks
lower than what would justify civil detention of a person not yet
accused of any crime), it should not consider the cost of these
crimes when setting bail amounts and limit bail forfeitures to situations of nonappearance. The prices bid by sureties would then
not reflect the true social cost of bail relative to jail. Below we
194 See, e.g., Ayres & Waldfogel, supra note 27, at 1028 n.147 Some scholars have
argued that bail forfeitures based on subsequent crimes are unwise because forfeitures
are unlikely to provide much additional deterrence to the defendants beyond the criminal
sanctions for the additional crimes. See, e.g., Gouldin, supra note 190, at 864. Such arguments, however, ignore the incentives for the bail sureties, who will be motivated by the
risk of forfeitures to screen defendants (so that the most dangerous cannot obtain bail)
and to monitor them (so that the defendants know the odds of apprehension are high). Bail
forfeitures would make little economic sense if bail agents are not good at screening defendants for their risks of committing new crimes or at monitoring them to reduce those
risks, but there’s no reason to think that sureties cannot do those tasks.
195 See Mayson, supra note 1 at 499.
196 See id. at 518 (noting that, in eliminating or curbing bail, the recent reform movement “crystallizes fundamental questions about pretrial policy,” including the degree of
dangerousness that should justify pretrial restraint).
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discuss a possible remedy for this problem—adjusting the bail
subsidy.
D. Setting the Correct Subsidy
In Section A, we showed that one good baseline for the maximum subsidy that the government should be willing to provide
for bail is the government’s cost of jail. That baseline, however,
assumes that the cost to the government is the full social costs of
jail. Eliminating that assumption produces two important insights, and we also consider below the more difficult issue of
whether the subsidy should be means tested.
1. Other social costs or benefits of jail.
If there are additional social costs or benefits of jail as compared to bail (excluding any costs borne by the defendant alone),
then the government should adjust its maximum subsidy to take
account of those costs or benefits. In other words, the government
should be willing to asymmetrically subsidize jail and bail, although possibly bail should be funded more heavily.
Consider the numerical example set forth in Section A and
assume that jail imposes an additional social cost of $400 (due to,
for example, the increased level of subsequent crime by jailed versus bailed defendants after their ultimate release).197 In that case,
the government should be willing to subsidize bail up to $2,400,
not merely the $2,000 cost of jail. For some defendants, that policy
could mean that the government spends more on bail than it
would on jail, but society would be better off.
Conversely, if jail has social benefits as compared to bail—
due to, for example, reducing defendants’ crimes while awaiting
trial—then the government could adjust the maximum subsidy
downward. Again, consider the numerical example set forth in
Section A and assume that jail has $400 of additional social benefits as compared to bail because it reduces additional pretrial
crimes. In that case, the government should be willing to subsidize bail up to only $1,600.
Alternatively, however, the government could keep the maximum subsidy the same but impose forfeitures on the bail agents
if defendants commit additional crimes (the option described in
Section C.2). Note that such an expansion of forfeitures also has

197

See supra note 176.
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the practical effect of reducing the government’s subsidy for bail
because, while the maximum price the government is willing to
pay the bail agent does not change (i.e., it stays at $2,000), the
government collects more forfeitures, which function like rebates
on the government’s initial subsidy for bail. That approach is
probably better from an economic standpoint because, unlike an
across-the-board reduction in the subsidy, the increased forfeitures enlist the bail agents in pricing and controlling the risk of
crime posed by particular defendants.
Finally, a mathematically savvy reader might notice that the
status quo—where the government funds jail at 100% and bail at
0%—could theoretically be justified under the analysis in the
prior paragraphs if jail, as compared to bail, always has positive
social benefits that precisely equal the cost of jail. Consider once
again the numeric example in Section A and make the additional
assumption that jail always has $2,000 of social benefits as compared to bail. In that case, the government should subsidize bail
at $0, which is the status quo. But the sheer implausibility of that
assumption—that jail has such a high level of social benefits as
compared to bail and that those benefits just happen to precisely
equal the costs of jail—underscores the irrationality of the current asymmetric funding of jail over bail.198
2. Costs imposed on the defendant.
Bail subsidies should generally not be increased to account
for the costs that jail imposes on defendants if (and this is a crucial assumption) defendants have the ability to pay to avoid those
costs (i.e., they are not “liquidity constrained”). The problem here
is, again, one of duplication. If the defendant is able, and is permitted,199 to pay additional money because jail is personally
costly, and the government also increases its subsidy to bail to
account for the costs on the defendant, then bail could be overly
subsidized.
198 Assuming that jail’s benefits more than exceed its costs does not justify the status
quo. Rather, it suggests that the government should impose a tax (a negative subsidy) on
bail.
199 We assume here that it would be very difficult to stop defendants from paying
additional funds to bail agents. Even if the government tried to prohibit such additional
payments, defendants would likely to be able to arrange side payments through relatives
or friends. Moreover, there is no good reason to prevent defendants from paying additional
amounts on top of the government’s bail subsidy. As long as the government does not also
increase its subsidy due to the costs imposed on the defendant, the defendant’s supplemental payments for bail increase efficiency.
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This point can be understood by again using the numerical
example in Section A and assuming that jail imposes an additional $400 of costs on a particular defendant so that the full social cost of jail is $2,400. Because the social cost of nonappearance
is $10,000, the defendant should be released if her flight risk is
less than 24% and jailed if it is above 24%. However, if the government increases its maximum bail subsidy to $2,400 and the
defendant still adds an additional $400 (again, that’s based on the
crucial assumption that the defendant is able to pay), then the
defendant could be inefficiently released where she has a flight
risk over 24% (though below 28%).
3. Means testing the subsidy.
The last point—that the government should not increase bail
subsidies when jail imposes costs on defendants and they have
the means to pay—leads naturally into a discussion of whether
the government should decrease bail subsidies whenever defendants have the means to pay to avoid jail. In other words, should
the government means test bail subsidies? This is a hard question.
The general thesis of this Article—that governments should
fund jail and bail symmetrically—might seem to suggest that bail
subsidies should not be means tested where, as has often been the
case in the last two centuries, the government bears all the costs
of jail without regard to the wealth of the defendant. Nevertheless, a strong case can be made for means testing bail subsidies.
First, most governmental subsidies are means tested. For example, governments subsidize trial counsel for poor but not rich
criminal defendants.200 Means testing bail subsidies would, therefore, be generally consistent with legal traditions.
Second, means testing bail subsidies would likely reduce total
government expenditures spent on pretrial options (jail plus bail).
That’s because, without bail subsidies, poor defendants are likely
to remain in jail, costing the government more than it would cost
to subsidize bail. However, extending bail subsidies to the
wealthy and middle class may increase government expenditures
200 See Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 344 (1963) (requiring that, in a felony
case, a state must provide a lawyer to any defendant “who is too poor to hire a lawyer”);
Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 37 (1972) (extending that right to any criminal case
that could result in incarceration); John P. Gross, Too Poor to Hire a Lawyer but Not Indigent: How States Use the Federal Poverty Guidelines to Deprive Defendants of Their Sixth
Amendment Right to Counsel, 70 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1173, 1193–1204 (2013) (discussing
federal and state eligibility requirements for assigned counsel).
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above current levels. Even without bail subsidies, wealthier defendants are likely to post bail to avoid the costs that jail imposes
on them. Subsidizing their bail would, therefore, raise government expenditures on bail but have no offsetting decrease of expenditures on jail. Thus, extending bail subsidies to wealthier defendants would be merely a transfer of wealth from the
government to those defendants.
Third, even our general thesis—that jail and bail should be
funded symmetrically—does not necessarily point against means
testing. If we exclude the category of unbailable defendants
(highly dangerous defendants who are ineligible for bail now and
would also be ineligible under a subsidized system), the government’s current funding for jail is directed almost exclusively toward jailing the poor. Among the rich and middle-class defendants eligible for bail, there’s no evidence that substantial
numbers forgo bail to remain in jail. Thus, while a symmetry principle strongly supports funding bail for the poor (because governments are currently funding their jail), it is ambiguous with respect to the rich (because governments are not, as a practical
matter, funding their jail).
Fourth, while some governments do not even attempt to impose the costs of jail on defendants, a fair number of modern governments do.201 At least some of the statutes authorizing these
“pay-to-stay” programs have explicit provisions that allow a judge
to waive the fees for indigent defendants,202 and such provisions
obviously authorize de jure means testing.
Moreover, means testing of jail fees is a practical reality
simply because governments cannot collect from the indigent and
very poor. After all, governments do not simply release defendants
who cannot pay for their jail. Governments finance the jail fees,
paying them up-front and billing the defendant for the charge.
Such financing is an implicit subsidy in the (many) cases where
the prisoner is not a good credit risk. For example, until recently,

201 See Jones v. Clark County, No. 001710-MR, 2020 WL 757095, at *14 (Ky. Ct. App.
Feb. 14, 2020) (holding that KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 441.265 (West 2021) authorizes state
jails to “assess fees associated with incarceration” against persons who are “incarcerated
upon criminal charges but not convicted thereof”). For other statutes authoring fees to be
imposed on defendants to cover the costs of pretrial detention, see N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A313 (2021); OKLA. STAT. tit. 22, § 979a (2021); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-3-201(6) (West 2021);
VA. CODE ANN. § 53.1-131.3 (2021); WIS. STAT. § 302.372(2)(a) (2021); WYO. STAT. ANN.
§ 7-13-109 (2021).
202 See, e.g., KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 441.265 (West 2021); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-3201(6) (West 2021); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 7-13-109 (2021).
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Nashville charged its pretrial detainees $44 per day for jail, but
the city did not get payment up-front. The city financed the
charges and thereafter was able to collect just 4.7% of the more
than $11 million in jail fees levied between 2015 and 2017.203
That’s a 95.3% subsidy for the jail fees generally, which almost
certainly meant a 100% subsidy for the (very many) poor defendants and perhaps no subsidy for the (few) middle-class and
wealthy defendants.204 In such jurisdictions, a symmetric approach to bail would require that the government finance bail
(paying for it initially and thereafter billing defendants for the
cost). The end result would be de facto means-tested bail subsidies because the government could collect from the rich but not
the poor.
Perhaps the best solution would be for wealthier defendants
to bear the cost of both bail and jail, but only if they are found
guilty. Currently, North Carolina and Virginia take that approach with respect to pretrial jail fees.205 The same approach
could be extended to bail. That approach would uphold a principle
of symmetry (bail and jail would be subsidized for the innocent,
not the guilty). It would cut the costs of a fully subsidized bail
system by more than half (because more than 50% of defendants

203

See Steven Hale, Pretrial Detainees Are Being Billed for Their Stay in Jail, APPEAL
(July 20, 2018), https://perma.cc/X4YU-NNEX. One among the many challenges that governments have in collecting jail fees is that such fees are dischargeable in bankruptcy
because they are, in theory, fees for services (maintenance in jail), not governmental fines
(like a criminal fine). See 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(7) (exempting governmental fines, but not
fees, from discharge in bankruptcy).
204 Nashville decided that the game wasn’t worth the candle and abandoned pretrial
jail fees in 2018. See Hale, supra note 203 (describing the fees as “both punitive and hardly
worth the trouble in financial terms” and noting the city’s decision to abandon them).
205 N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-313 (2021) (providing that a pretrial detainee is not liable
for jail fees “if the case or proceeding against him is dismissed, or if acquitted, or if judgment is arrested, or if probable cause is not found, or if the grand jury fails to return a
true bill”); VA. CODE ANN. § 53.1-131.3 (2021) (similar). However, the acquitted appear to
get no such exemption in Wisconsin and Kentucky. See WIS. STAT. § 302.372(2)(a) (2021)
(authorizing counties to seek reimbursement for “any” expenses incurred for “any” period
of pretrial detention); Jones, 2020 WL 757095, at *14 (holding that the county could bill a
pretrial detainee $10 per day for his fourteen-month pretrial detention even though all
charges against him were ultimately dismissed); see also Jason Riley & Katrina Helmer,
Kentucky Appeals Court Rules Jails Can Force Inmates to Pay for Stay Even If Not Guilty,
WDRB (Feb. 7, 2020), https://perma.cc/5L55-SA9U; Izabela Zaluska, Paying to Stay in
Jail: Hidden Fees Turn Inmates into Debtors, CRIME REP. (Sept. 17, 2019),
https://perma.cc/485T-J8PE. Justice Douglas in Schilb would have held levying such fees
on the acquitted unconstitutional on due process grounds. Schilb, 404 U.S. at 378 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
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are ultimately convicted).206 It would be de facto means testing
(because, as a practical matter, the poor cannot be made to pay
for jail or bail even if they are guilty). And the approach would
further the general principle that the criminal justice system
should strive to punish only the guilty, not the innocent.207 While
the motive for demanding that defendants pay for their bail (or
jail) may not be punitive,208 the practice does impose a very high
cost on them. Imposing these costs may make some sense when
the defendant is guilty,209 but the practice is more troubling when
the defendant is acquitted.
E. Soliciting and Considering Bids for Surety Services
We have generally assumed that governments should solicit
bids for surety services and award contracts to the lowest bidders,
but there may be reasons to deviate from that baseline. For example, assume that two bail sureties use different monitoring
technologies that are equally effective in terms of preventing defendants from violating the terms of release, but one technology
costs $40 more and is much more comfortable for defendants than
the other. If the government awards the bail contract to the lowest bidder, the bail surety with the less expensive (and less comfortable) technology is likely to win. That result, however, might
be socially inefficient where defendants find the more comfortable
technology to be so much better that they are willing to pay $50
to be bailed to the surety using that technology.
The obvious solution to this problem is to allow a defendant
to chip in $50 toward paying the bail surety with the comfortable
technology. Thus, if bail surety A uses the comfortable technology
and bids $1,640, while bail surety B uses the other technology and
bids $1,600, the government should award the contract to A because the net cost to the government ($1,640 - $50 = $1,590) is

206

FAQ Detail: What Is the Probability of Conviction for Felony Defendants?, BUREAU

OF JUST. STAT., https://perma.cc/VA7P-UD7Y.
207 An additional benefit of subsidizing the acquitted is that it reduces the incentive
for the innocent to plead guilty. See Murat C. Mungan & Jonathan Klick, Reducing False
Guilty Pleas and Wrongful Convictions Through Exoneree Compensation, 59 J.L. & ECON.
173, 178–80 (2016) (arguing for “greater exoneree compensation”).
208 See Slade v. Hampton Rds. Reg’l Jail, 407 F.3d. 243, 250–51 (4th Cir. 2005);
Barnes v. Brown County, No. 11-CV-00968, 2013 WL 1314015, at *8–10 (E.D. Wis. 2013).
209 Indeed, imposing these costs on guilty defendants may be desirable because monetary sanctions generally impose lower social costs than incarceration. See Louis Kaplow
& Steven Shavell, Economic Analysis of Law, in 3 HANDBOOK OF PUBLIC ECONOMICS,
1747–52 (A.J. Auerbach & M. Feldstein eds., 2002).
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lower. Allowing defendants to chip in incremental amounts based
on their preferences mimics an unsubsidized marketplace, in
which bail sureties would avoid imposing excessively burdensome
conditions on defendants lest they choose another bail agent.
That solution works for defendants who have some funds
(even if those funds are insufficient to pay the full costs of bail),
but what of truly penniless defendants? One solution is for the
government to prohibit technologies and bail practices that impose very high costs on the defendant. Another is to allow certain
technologies or practices only with the defendant’s consent (which
the defendant would likely not give if other bail sureties were
available). A final solution would be for the government to use an
algorithm that selected the winning bidder based not only on the
price demanded but also on other factors, including the defendant’s preferences for some bail sureties and not others. Such incremental adjustments to the bidding process would help to ensure that the “friendly custody” of bail remained somewhat
friendly to defendants’ interests and that the sureties selected
would be, at least in part, of a defendant’s “own choosing.”
F.

Agency Costs

If jail is so much more expensive than bail, why does the government now incarcerate so many defendants? One answer may
be that, while private sector actors who stubbornly cling to their
poor choices should be driven from the market, government actors
face the far weaker discipline of the ballot box. We are by no
means the first to argue that current incarceration rates are inefficient both in terms of total social costs and costs imposed on the
public fisc.210 The novelty of our Article comes from our proposed
solution.
Agency costs provide a second reason for excessive incarceration. Judges “face the possibility of public scorn (and for elected
judges, lost votes) for releasing defendants who flee or commit
crimes” and “do not internalize the enormous costs to society of
detaining millions of defendants pretrial.”211 As a result, judges
may set excessively high bail. Our proposal is indeed vulnerable
to these agency costs. A judge who wants to incarcerate a defendant might set bail arbitrarily high so that the subsidy offered

210
211

See supra note 1.
Samuel R. Wiseman, Fixing Bail, 84 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 417, 417 (2016).
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by the government is insufficient to induce any surety to accept
the risk of flight.
We have three responses. First, federal and state constitutional protections against excessive bail provide some check
against arbitrarily high bail amounts;212 in our current system,
many defendants sit in jail because they cannot afford bail set at
a few hundred dollars.213 Second, our proposed system may limit
the damage caused by judges who intentionally set arbitrarily
high bail by reducing the need for judicial discretion. As we noted
above, our proposed subsidy lessens the need for a judge to make
an individualized determination of a defendant’s ability to pay.214
Indeed, our proposed system relies on the private sector to estimate the probability that the defendant will flee or otherwise misbehave; the government need only estimate the likely cost of this
misbehavior should it occur and ensure that the surety assumes
liability for this cost. Thus, there is much less need for an individualized determination of the appropriate bail amount, and courts
could make greater use of scheduled bail amounts set in advance.
Finally, as discussed more thoroughly in the next Part, the fact
that it is the sureties, and not judges or other government actors,
who will estimate the risk of misbehavior makes our proposal less
vulnerable to agency costs than the primary modern alternative—government-run pretrial release systems.
IV. PRIVATE BAIL VERSUS GOVERNMENT-RUN SYSTEMS
In this final Part of our Article, we compare our proposal for
subsidized bail to a government-run system of risk assessment
and monitoring of released defendants, which appears to be the
alternative to the current bail system favored by reform-minded
legislators, courts, and commentators. Such a “pretrial services”
approach215 is essentially a replacement of private bail with a

212

See infra Part IV.A.
See supra note 30 and accompanying text.
214 See supra Part III.C.1.
215 We use the term “pretrial services” to cover both risk assessment and monitoring—
i.e., to cover the entire system typically proposed for replacing private bail. That same
convention is followed in some jurisdictions. For example, the D.C. Pretrial Services
Agency performs both risk assessments and monitoring. See Court Support, PRETRIAL
SERVS. AGENCY FOR D.C., https://perma.cc/WR9J-FA9D; Defendant Supervision, PRETRIAL
SERVS. AGENCY FOR D.C., https://perma.cc/Y79Z-7CZN. Other jurisdictions, such as New
Jersey, use the term to refer only to postrelease monitoring. See Pretrial Services Program,
N.J. JUDICIARY (May 2017), https://perma.cc/4FUT-TNKR (describing the establishment
213
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government-run system designed to accomplish the functions traditionally performed by bail sureties (sorting and monitoring).
The result would be that the middle-ground options between jail
and unconditional release—territory traditionally dominated by
private bail—would be ceded to governmental actors.
The comparison leads to an obvious first question: Why
should the law preserve private bail sureties? After all, if the government is paying for both jail and its alternative, perhaps the
government should run both. That, essentially, is the approach
taken by jurisdictions like New Jersey, which have eliminated or
dramatically curtailed the use of bail in favor of a system that has
(i) judges and magistrates assessing the risks of releasing defendants (often with newly developed computer tools) and (ii) government-run monitoring systems to keep track of defendants and to
make sure that they show up for court dates.
We offer two arguments for preserving a role for the private
sector in this middle ground. In Section A we argue that private
sureties should be preserved as a traditional check on government abuse, bias, or simple incompetence. Part of the argument
here is deeply traditionalist—that cherished constitutional rights
should not be quickly sacrificed without considering alternatives
(such as subsidized bail) that preserve rights while addressing
current problems (excessive pretrial jailing of the poor). Part of
the argument is also based on the reason underlying the right to
bail—that the right empowers private actors to “limit[ ] government power.”216 Such private checks are valuable tools for assuring the proper functioning of government and are worthwhile
even if not deeply traditional.
Section B below sets forth the economic case for preserving
some role for private actors, and that case begins with the same
insight at the heart of Professor Ronald Coase’s theory of the
firm.217 The question of whether the government should allow private sureties to assist in sorting pretrial defendants and monitoring those released or to perform those tasks itself is fundamentally a “make-or-buy” decision. The question is whether the
organization should obtain needed goods and services by

of the state’s “Pretrial Services Unit to conduct the pretrial monitoring” of defendants).
The broader meaning of “pretrial services” is being used solely for convenience.
216 State v. Brooks, 604 N.W.2d 345, 352 (Minn. 2000) (holding that the state’s constitutional right to bail by “sufficient sureties” precludes a court from requiring cash-only
bail).
217 See generally R.H. Coase, The Nature of the Firm, 4 ECONOMICA 386 (1937).
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contracting with outside entities (which makes the organization
marginally smaller) or by supplying them internally (which
makes the organization marginally larger).218 In short, the question is ultimately one about the optimal size of the organization.
In Section B, we marshal theoretical and empirical evidence for
maintaining a limited governmental presence and preserving private actors in the area of middle-ground options between jail and
unconditional release.
A. Bail as a Fundamental Private Check on Government
While the Eighth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution does
not protect a distinct right to bail (only a right against “excessive
bail,” if bail is available),219 the right to bail is expressly protected
in a large number of state constitutions. In those states, the right
to bail has in the past been viewed as a “fundamental”220 and
“cherished”221 right that “limits government power,”222 especially
“the scope and power of judicial institutions.”223 Indeed, even at
the federal level, the Supreme Court has extolled statutory rights
to bail as important to preserve lest “the presumption of innocence, secured only after centuries of struggle, would lose its
meaning.”224
As mentioned in this Article’s Introduction, state constitutions securing the right to bail most commonly use language
providing that, subject to very limited exceptions, all criminal defendants “shall be bailable by sufficient sureties.”225 Not surprisingly, multiple state supreme courts have held that the “sufficient
sureties” language protects the right of criminal defendants to be
released upon the delivery of a private surety bond.226 Indeed,

218 Coasean analysis has previously been applied to assess whether the government
should use private firms for certain functions or perform those functions itself. See David
A. Super, Privatization, Policy Paralysis, and the Poor, 96 CALIF. L. REV. 393, 407–13
(2008) (applying analysis in the context of social assistance).
219 United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 752 (1987).
220 State v. Johnson, 294 A.2d 245, 248 (N.J. 1972).
221 Fry v. State, 990 N.E.2d 429, 434 (Ind. 2013) (quoting Bozovichar v. State, 103
N.E.2d 680, 681 (Ind. 1952)).
222 Brooks, 604 N.W.2d at 352.
223 Id. at 350.
224 Stack v. Boyle, 342 U.S. 1, 4 (1951).
225 See, e.g., WASH. CONST. art. I, § 20.
226 See, e.g., State v. Barton, 331 P.3d 50, 56–57 (Wash. 2014) (citing cases from the
supreme courts of Idaho, Vermont, Ohio, Minnesota, and Louisiana interpreting their
states’ “sufficient sureties” clauses to “support the notion that a defendant must be allowed
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while some state courts hold that “sufficient sureties” clauses do
permit courts to designate cash as the only acceptable surety in
particular cases, no state court has ever held that such clauses
permit a state to designate governmental officers and agencies as
the only acceptable sureties for all cases.227
Demonstrating that many states would face constitutional
barriers to replacing bail with a government-run system does not,
however, prove very much. New Jersey had such a constitutional
provision guaranteeing bail by “sufficient sureties,” and the state
supreme court interpreted it broadly.228 None of that prevented
reformers from having the constitutional protection repealed so
that a pretrial services model could replace bail. The New Jersey
Constitution now states merely that defendants will be “eligible
for pretrial release” and then specifies the circumstances when
“[p]retrial release may be denied.”229 There’s no longer a constitutional guarantee of a right.
The ACLU celebrated New Jersey’s passage of the legislation
that paved the way for the constitutional change as a “historic day
for civil rights.”230 Yet the repeal of longstanding constitutional
rights should not normally be a cause for celebration. While it’s
true that New Jersey’s current statutes governing pretrial release
do not seem especially draconian, they can be changed through
the ordinary legislative process to become much less favorable toward the release of defendants.
In noting this concern, we are not arguing that states should
never change their constitutional provisions governing individual
rights. There is an entire literature devoted to the advantages
and disadvantages of constitutional entrenchment.231 At a minimum, that literature leads to the more modest proposition that
entrenchment is sometimes good, and that’s enough to support
the option of accessing a third party surety” to post bail); see also id. at 57 (reaching the
same conclusion under the Washington State Constitution).
227 See, e.g., State v. Briggs, 666 N.W.2d 573, 583 (Iowa 2003) (sustaining the legality
of a cash-only bail requirement “so long as the accused is permitted access to a surety in
some form”).
228 See Johnson, 294 A.2d at 247–48.
229 N.J. CONST. art. I, ¶ 11 (emphasis added).
230 ACLU-NJ Hails Passage of NJ Bail Reform as Historic Day for Civil Rights, ACLU
(Aug. 4, 2014), https://perma.cc/XJA2-33K3.
231 For an essay strongly opposing constitutional amendments, see generally
Kathleen M. Sullivan, Constitutional Constancy: Why Congress Should Cure Itself of
Amendment Fever, 17 CARDOZO L. REV. 691 (1996). For a more nuanced law and economics
approach to the issue, plus an entry into the modern literature, see Michael D. Gilbert,
The Law and Economics of Entrenchment, 54 GA. L. REV. 61, 69–74, 83–89 (2019).
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the more modest argument that bail reformers should hesitate to
eliminate centuries-old rights. Other, less disruptive options
should be explored first, and the subsidized bail proposed herein
is one such alternative—one that needs no constitutional
changes.
Beyond that traditionalist argument, there is also another
major difference between a subsidized bail system and a government-run system. The traditional bail system was designed to impose a private check on government, particularly on the “scope
and power of judicial institutions.”232 Subsidized bail preserves
that check. Indeed, as discussed in Part III, even do-nothing bail
agents can be effective checks on governmental impulses toward
excessive incarceration. Traditional bail systems also afforded
criminal defendants the ability to select jailers of their “own
choosing.”233 Again, subsidized bail preserves that traditional
check to the maximum extent possible.234
By comparison, a government-run system such as New Jersey’s does the opposite—it aggrandizes governmental power, specifically judicial power. The value of the traditional check provided by bail is demonstrated empirically in an article by Ayres
and Waldfogel showing that market competition among bail
agents can both reveal one form of governmental abuse—judicial
discrimination against minorities—and also counterbalance the
discrimination to some degree.235
Specifically, the article showed that New Haven judges set
“significantly higher bail amounts for black defendants,” but that
bail bond agents “charged significantly lower rates to minority defendants than to whites.”236 The existence of the private bail market allowed the authors to collect “powerful market evidence of
unjustified racial discrimination in bail setting” by judges.237 And
as an additional benefit, the competition within the bail market
also served to “mitigat[e] the effects of state discrimination.”238

232

Brooks, 604 N.W. at 350.
2 HAWKINS, supra note 22, at 115.
234 See supra Part III (discussing a mechanism for allowing even poor defendants to
retain some control over the bail system by favoring some bail agents over others).
235 See Ayres & Waldfogel, supra note 27, at 993–94.
236 Id. at 993 (emphasis in original).
237 Id.
238 Id. at 994. To see this point, consider the effects that higher bail amounts would
have in a state like Illinois, where the court system itself provides de facto bail by charging
a flat 10% deposit of the amount set by the judge. Discriminatory bail amounts then translate directly into discriminatory deposits for release. By contrast, competition in the New
233
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A subsidized bail system can provide the same benefits detected by Ayres and Waldfogel. In a subsidized market, competition by bail agents can drive the bail rates for minority defendants
down, just as happened in the New Haven market. The lower
rates will still provide transparent, market-based evidence to detect judicial discrimination. The only difference is that the lower
rates will redound to the benefit of the taxpayer. Such competitive revelations of discrimination, and mitigations thereof, remain important even in—perhaps, especially in—an era where,
in setting bail, judges are increasingly relying on algorithmic
risk-assessment tools that some critics worry may also be racially
biased.239 Competition among a multitude of private bail agents
can help reveal such problems. Centralized systems dominated by
governmental actors cannot.
Finally, our point can be made concrete by the extremely unfortunate case of Kalief Browder—a case that is often used in arguing for the elimination of cash bail.240 Browder was a sixteenyear-old child arrested on May 15, 2010, for allegedly stealing a
backpack.241 Though the charges against Browder were ultimately
dismissed, he spent three years in pretrial detention on New
York’s Rikers Island and ultimately committed suicide after his
release.242 Recent scholarship on bail as well as prominent news
reporting have incorrectly asserted that Browder was “held on
bail for three years” “because he could not afford the $3000 bail
necessary for his pretrial release.”243 Yet Browder’s family did
raise the money for a bail bond only to discover that, just a few
weeks after the arrest in the case, the combined actions of New
Haven market resulted in the bail agents “charg[ing] black male defendants rates that
were almost 19 percent lower than the rates charged to white male defendants.” Id. at 993.
239 See Aziz Z. Huq, Racial Equity in Algorithmic Criminal Justice, 68 DUKE L.J.
1043, 1045–49, 1076–82 (2019) (noting the critics’ concerns but finding the current evidence inconclusive).
240 See Jesse McKinley & Ashley Southall, Kalief Browder’s Suicide Inspired a Push
to End Cash Bail. Now Lawmakers Have a Deal., N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 29, 2019),
https://perma.cc/VH2G-4S52 (reporting that, “[f]or many in New York, the inequities in
the cash bail system were crystallized [by the case of] a Bronx teenager named Kalief
Browder”).
241 See Jennifer Gonnerman, Before the Law, NEW YORKER (Sept. 29, 2014),
https://perma.cc/6KCJ-XY9C.
242 See Jennifer Gonnerman, Kalief Browder, 1993–2015, NEW YORKER (June 7,
2015), https://perma.cc/N8S9-FVD3.
243 Liana M. Goff, Pricing Justice: The Wasteful Enterprise of America’s Bail System,
82 BROOK. L. REV. 881, 884 & n.12 (2017); see also McKinley & Southall, supra note 241,
(asserting incorrectly that “Kalief Browder spent three years on Rikers Island because his
family could not raise $3,000”).
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York’s Department of Probation and the presiding judge had remanded Browder to jail “without bail.”244 Thus, while the first few
weeks of Browder’s pretrial incarceration do show the harsh effects of an unsubsidized bail system on the poor (and subsidies
could clearly have freed Browder sooner245), it was not an unsubsidized bail system that kept Browder in custody for years. Rather, it was a modern governmental bureaucracy that classified
him as unbailable. Giving even more power to such a bureaucracy
and removing any private check on it does not seem like a step
forward.
B. The Coasean Perspective
Just as a Coasean firm must choose which goods to buy and
which to produce itself, so too must a government decide which
functions to purchase and which to do itself. All-or-nothing answers are unlikely to be correct. That, however, is only the beginning of the analysis, because the government could obtain the services of private actors through two quite different structures: (i) it
could use long-term contracts to obtain services from one or a few
private providers, or (ii) it could buy services through something
akin to a spot market—a single contract covering one instance.
Our proposal for subsidized bail sureties falls into the second option, not the first.

244 See Gonnerman, supra note 242; see also Candace White, Note, Bias and Guilt
Before Innocence: How the American Civil Liberties Union Seeks to Reform a System That
Penalizes Indigent Defendants, 83 ALB. L. REV. 657, 665 (2019) (noting that after “[s]everal
days,” Browder’s family “procured the $900 needed for his release” but that “the judge
revoked Browder’s eligibility for bail as he was on probation at the time of his arrest”);
Alysia Santo, No Bail, Less Hope: The Death of Kalief Browder, MARSHALL PROJECT (June
9, 2015), https://perma.cc/2TRW-654F (stating that, seventy-four days after Browder’s arrest, “the [trial] judge remanded him without bail” so that “paying for his release was no
longer an option”). In a Netflix documentary film, Browder’s mother describes in detail
raising the $900 to obtain a $3,000 bail bond but then being surprised to learn from the
bail bond agent that the courts had classified Browder as unbailable. See Time: The Kalief
Browder Story: Part 1—The System (Spike Mar. 1, 2017) (time index 40:15 to 40:49). In
the same documentary, Browder’s lawyer states that the Department of Probation “put a
hold” on Browder’s case so that he could not “leave jail until this case [was] resolved.” Id.
(time index 41:10 to 41:20). Browder’s lawyer has confirmed with the authors that the hold
was placed on Browder “in June of 2010” and that the hold meant he could not leave jail
even if bail had been posted. Email from Paul Prestia to John Duffy, (April 23, 2021) (on
file with the author).
245 We can confidently assert that Browder would have been released—and released
quickly—through a subsidized bail system because, as discussed in note 245, supra, a bail
bond agent was willing to be a surety on Browder’s $3,000 bail in exchange for $900.
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To understand what that first option would look like, consider a government that agrees that jail should not be asymmetrically subsidized over other pretrial options but that also decides
against subsidizing pretrial monitoring through bail sureties. Instead, the government decides to contract with (and, importantly,
pay) a single ankle-bracelet provider to monitor released defendants and to ensure that they make their court appointments. In
other words, the government agrees to pay for one of what we
have described as the middle-ground pretrial options (those between full incarceration and unrestricted release), but it will pay
only a single entity to occupy the field.
Such a system might well be superior to today’s system because, by paying for the ankle-bracelet monitoring, the government would be reducing the current asymmetrical funding between jail and the middle-ground pretrial options that are likely
both less expensive and more defendant-friendly. In our view,
however, the system would likely be suboptimal for multiple reasons, including (i) that there would be no easy way to determine
whether another provider would perform better and (ii) that the
system would likely leave more decisions inside the government
(e.g., whether an ankle bracelet is cost-justified).
Under our proposal, multiple private sureties would compete
for government subsidies in a market where performance is easily
measured. In addition, as discussed in Part III, those competing
private sureties would get to make decisions about which technologies and monitoring techniques to use, both generally and with
respect to particular defendants. Competition would push private
sureties to find better approaches, and those that perform poorly
would suffer losses and be driven from the market.
That’s the theory anyway. Below we discuss two points frequently raised in the literature on bail and pretrial detention:
(i) the empirical evidence about the effectiveness of bail sureties
and (ii) the current rapid technological progress affecting the
field.
1. Existing empirical evidence.
Any proposal to maintain private bail sureties should be accompanied by evidence that those sureties perform their basic
functions well. Compelling evidence is difficult to find, however,
because courts do not make pretrial release decisions randomly.
Rather, lower-risk defendants are released on their own recognizance or qualify for government-run pretrial release programs
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while higher-risk defendants must post bail.246 Thus, simple comparisons of outcomes are biased against bail. Among more sophisticated peer-reviewed articles, surprisingly few attempt both to
control for this selection bias and to compare bail sureties to other
forms of release.247
Perhaps the strongest evidence supporting commercial sureties comes from Professors Eric Helland and Alexander Tabarrok.
Using a matching model, they estimate that
similar individuals are 7.3 percentage points, or 28 percent,
less likely to fail to appear when released on surety bond than
when released on their own recognizance. Similar individuals
are also 3.9 percentage points, or 18 percent, less likely to fail
to appear when released on surety bond than when released
on deposit bond.248
They further find that “the fugitive rates under surety release are
53, 47, and 64 percent lower than the fugitive rates under own
recognizance, deposit bond, and cash bond, respectively.”249 They
conclude that “states that ban commercial bail pay a high price”250
and that “[b]ounty hunters, not public police, appear to be the true
long arms of the law.”251
Two studies suggest that well-managed government-run pretrial service programs achieve higher appearance rates. Professor

246 See, e.g., Eric Helland & Alexander Tabarrok, The Fugitive: Evidence on Public
Versus Private Law Enforcement from Bail Jumping, 47 J.L. & ECON. 93, 94 (2004).
247 A recent literature review laments “a distinct lack of research that utilizes any
amount of methodological rigor,” but concludes that “[i]t appears that more restrictive
bond types are associated with lower [failure to appear] rates.” See Kristin Bechtel,
Alexander M. Holsinger, Christopher T. Lowenkamp & Madeline J. Warren, A Meta-Analytic
Review of Pretrial Research: Risk Assessment, Bond Type, and Interventions, 42 AM. J.
CRIM. JUST. 443, 460 (2017). While not comparing surety bonds to other release conditions, some papers find that larger bond amounts increase appearance rates. See
Landes, supra note 191, at 322; Samuel L. Myers, Jr. The Economics of Bail Jumping,
10 J. LEGAL STUD. 381, 396 (1981). Three recent papers focus on Philadelphia, which
follows a system similar to that of Illinois—including granting release based on 10%
deposit bonds. See David S. Abrams & Chris Rohlfs, Optimal Bail and the Value of Freedom: Evidence from the Philadelphia Bail Experiment, 49 ECON. INQUIRY 750, 762
(2011); Arpit Gupta, Christopher Hansman & Ethan Frenchman, The Heavy Costs of
High Bail: Evidence from Judge Randomization, 45 J. LEGAL STUD. 471, 471 (2016);
Aurélie Ouss & Megan Stevenson, Bail, Jail, and Pretrial Misconduct: The Influence of
Prosecutors 13–31 (June 20, 2020) (working paper), https://perma.cc/5KQF-EKEU.
248 See Helland & Tabarrok, supra note 247, at 108. For criticism of the Helland &
Tabarrok study, see Bechtel et al., supra note 247, at 448.
249 Helland & Tabarrok, supra note 247, at 110.
250 Id. at 114.
251 Id. at 118.
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Stevens Clarke, Jean Freeman, and Professor Gary Koch find
that “[pretrial service] releasees were much less likely to fail to
appear in court or be rearrested, controlling for criminal history
and court disposition time, than the bondsman releasees.”252 Similarly, Matt Barno, Deyanira Nevárez Martínez, and Professor
Kirk Williams find that “defendants who received supervised release under [a pretrial release] program were significantly less
likely to [fail to appear] than similarly situated defendants who
were released on cash bail.”253 The pretrial release programs were,
however, selective. For example, in the Barno et al. study, judges
approved just 37% of defendants recommended for the program
by a probation officer,254 and the judicial decisions appeared to be
based on information unobservable by the researchers.255 As a result, the apparent success of the pretrial programs could be due
to selection bias.
Moreover, a high appearance rate is not the only relevant
metric. One must also consider the costs that a pretrial release
mechanism imposes on defendants, the government, and society
more generally. A pretrial services program could undoubtedly
yield very high appearance rates by subjecting defendants to curfews, intrusive and expensive monitoring, and threats of severe
sanctions for noncompliance. For example, in the jurisdiction
studied by Clarke et al., defendants released on bond lost their
bond but faced no further sanction when they failed to appear,
while defendants released under the pretrial services program
who failed to appear faced a possible two-year prison sentence.256
In sum, the empirical literature, while thin, supports the
view that bail sureties perform their functions well enough to
have substantial positive effects on court-appearance rates. The
literature comparing sureties to pretrial services is even more
limited and appears not yet to contain any study that convincingly accounts for selection effects and other differences (like the
differential collateral sanctions for nonappearance). The

252 Stevens H. Clarke, Jean L. Freeman & Gary G. Koch, Bail Risk: A Multivariate
Analysis, 5 J. LEGAL STUD. 341, 368 (1976).
253 Matt Barno, Deyanira Nevárez Martínez & Kirk R. Williams, Exploring Alternatives to Cash Bail: An Evaluation of Orange County’s Pretrial Assessment and Release Supervision (PARS) Program, 45 AM. J. CRIM. JUST., 363 (Dec. 6, 2019).
254 Id. at 375.
255 See id. at 372 & tbl.3 (reporting the observable variable explained just four percent—i.e., a pseudo-R2 of .043—of the judge’s decisions to follow the probation officer’s
recommendations).
256 See Clarke et al., supra note 253, at 351.
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literature also does not try to determine whether pretrial release
programs are cost-justified in comparison to a bail surety system.
Finally, some of the most dramatic evidence comes from recently launched community bail funds, which, as previously mentioned, have reported achieving very high appearance rates (e.g.,
95%) at low cost.257 If verified through peer-reviewed empirical
studies, such results may demonstrate that innovative approaches to bail suretyship can produce better results than both
extant commercial sureties and government-run pretrial services
programs.
2. New technologies and the crucible of competition.
Bail opponents may dismiss the empirical evidence we present above by arguing that new technologies have made bail “archaic.”258 For example, Samuel Wiseman argues that “electronic
monitoring will present a superior alternative to money bail for
addressing flight risk.”259 Private sureties, however, can use those
technologies too.
Again, the crucial issue here is which actor or actors should
control the vast middle ground of options lying between incarceration and unconditional release. The existence of this middle
ground is not new. It’s the string on which bail sureties have held
bailed defendants; it’s the liberty of the yard in debtors’ prisons;
and it’s simply unbundled incarceration from an economic perspective. The technology operating in this space is new, but any
argument that the possibility of vibrant innovation favors governmental control is precisely backward.
In comparing the advantages and disadvantages of governmental control versus market competition in a field, modern economic literature generally concludes that innovation and technological progress will be dampened by eliminating competitive
enterprises in favor of governmental provision of goods and services. Professor Andrei Shleifer, for example, writes that it has
“become[ ] clear that private ownership is the crucial source of incentives to innovate and become efficient, which accounts for
what [Nobel laureate Paul Samuelson] called the ‘tremendous

257 See supra Part II.C; see also, e.g., FAQ, BAIL PROJECT, https://perma.cc/73JSEB7N (reporting a 95% appearance rate during first ten years of the Project’s predecessor
organization).
258 Wiseman, supra note 1, at 1352.
259 Id. at 1344.
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vitality’ of the free enterprise system.”260 Indeed, even though
there is a longstanding debate over whether large or small firms
are better at innovating, both sides of the debate rely on competitive incentives as the force driving firms to innovate—with atomistic firms spurred to innovate by short-term price competition
and large firms motivated by long-term competition to gain market power.261 Thus, even scholars who accept the possibility that
large firms could be more innovative than small ones are willing
to endorse a presumptive rule that a merger to monopoly is likely
to harm innovation.262
The absence of competitive pressures on government institutions is the central reason why they often are not as innovative as
private firms. Even counterexamples of dramatic government innovations—e.g., the Manhattan Project and NASA’s space program of the 1960s—may have been spurred on by intense competition among world superpowers at the time. The coronavirus
pandemic has also delivered vivid reminders of just how uninnovative the ordinary processes of government bureaucracies are,
as news reports document multiple states (including, coincidentally, New Jersey) struggling to update computerized unemployment systems that were maintained in a “nearly extinct” computer coding language considered “outdated” in the 1980s.263 If
innovation is important to modernizing pretrial sorting and monitoring, heavy reliance on state bureaucracies may be unwise.
Having established why private actors are generally preferable in fields of rapid innovation, we address three new technologies that should favor more reliance on private actors in the
middle-ground pretrial options. The first is electronic procurement, including computerized reverse auctions. While that
260
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technology has not previously been mentioned in the literature on
pretrial detention, it is important because it provides a structural
change to markets generally. Such electronic procurement arose
late in the twentieth century, but it has already become an important mechanism by which both public and private entities interact with decentralized markets for goods and services.264 Because the emergence of such a new technology shifts downward
the costs of relying on decentralized markets, Coasean theory
suggests that public and private entities should be more willing
to substitute such markets in place of the alternatives of self-provision or long-term contracts.
Two other technologies—algorithmic predictive software and
new monitoring technologies—are mentioned much more frequently in the pretrial detention literature because they are directly relevant to the functions traditionally performed by bail
sureties. Each technology remains controversial for various reasons, each remains a field of continuing development, and each
may not necessarily be the right approach in many situations.
In predicting which defendants are riskier, algorithmic technologies might, as some scholars argue, “perform better than the
intuitive methods used by judges or other experts”265 and thereby
produce tremendous benefits.266 Yet while the literature usually
assumes that judges or magistrates will use such technologies in
directly determining which defendants should get released, private actors can also use them. Bail sureties have traditionally attempted to grant bonds only to good risks; new software may allow them to perform that function much more efficiently.
Moreover, algorithmic technologies remain controversial and
uncertain. They could be discriminatory, though the evidence so
far seems inconclusive.267 Judges might also be unreceptive to algorithms—following them initially but then slipping back to their
old habits, as one study found.268 And it might also be that assessing the riskiness of defendants is not amenable to Moneyballstyle analysis of hard data but instead needs to rely on what
264 Ching-Chung Kuo, Pamela Rogers & Richard E. White, Online Reverse Auctions:
An Overview, 13 J. INT’L TECH. & INFO. MGMT. 275, 276–77 (2004).
265 See Megan Stevenson, Assessing Risk Assessment in Action, 103 MINN. L. REV.
303, 321 (2018) (summarizing other scholars’ views).
266 See Jon Kleinberg, Himabindu Lakkaraju, Jure Leskovec, Jens Ludwig & Sendhil
Mullainathan, Human Decisions and Machine Predictions, 133 Q.J. ECON. 237, 270–71
(2018) (offering evidence to support high benefits from such algorithms).
267 See Huq, supra note 240, at 1076–82.
268 See Stevenson, supra note 266, at 352–59.
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information theorists call “tacit knowledge,”269 which is difficult
or impossible to encode into a database.270 Finally, even if algorithmic technologies ultimately succeed, no one is yet sure which
algorithms will work best.
Monitoring technologies are subject to similar controversies
and uncertainties. While it’s likely true, as some scholars argue,
that electronic monitoring is “a far less burdensome means [as
compared to jail] of achieving the government’s aims” in pretrial
control of defendants,271 that’s not necessarily the right comparison. The government can also release defendants on bail or grant
them release subject to much less onerous conditions. As compared to those other options, several scholars have found that
electronic monitoring is unnecessary or not cost-justified in many
cases.272 Moreover, many defendants seem to fail to appear merely
because they forget, so simple, low-tech innovations like reminder
calls or postcards can substantially raise appearance rates.273
Compared to these other options, electronic monitoring is not
cheap in either the monetary costs274 or the nonmonetary costs

269 See generally, e.g., MICHAEL POLANYI, THE TACIT DIMENSION (1966) (originating
the vast literature on tacit knowledge).
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https://perma.cc/RR2D-WKAM (instructing bail bond agents that risk analysis is “more an
art than a science” and urging them, as part of their risk analysis, to gather extensive
information about the defendant’s “tattoos, hobbies, favorite pastimes, work and address
histories and best friends”).
271 Wiseman, supra note 1, at 1404.
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WEIBRECHT, PRETRIAL JUST. INST., STATE OF THE SCIENCE OF PRETRIAL RELEASE
RECOMMENDATIONS AND SUPERVISION 27 (2011) (similar).
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imposed on the defendant.275 Electronic monitoring is also developing into multiple forms, including basic ankle bracelets based
on decades-old technology, more sophisticated bracelets that perform new functions (such as continuously monitoring for intoxication),276 and even cutting-edge innovations relying on GPSenabled cell phones, automated video calls, and facial recognition
software.277
All these uncertainties justify keeping monitoring and risk
assessments decentralized, with private actors experimenting
with different approaches and perhaps counterbalancing flawed
governmental choices. If decisions are instead centralized within
the government, bureaucratic actors will likely have insufficient
incentive to run these experiments and to try new approaches.
The promise and perils of new technologies provide a strong justification for maintaining competition in the area.
CONCLUSION
The current criminal justice system jails too many poor defendants, but the root cause is not bail. The poor suffer excessive
pretrial incarceration for the simple reason that governments
massively fund jail but not bail. Eliminating that asymmetry—
having the government pay for bail sureties up to the costs of
jail—would increase the liberty of presumptively innocent defendants and, because bail sureties usually are much less expensive than jail cells, save billions of dollars each year.
If subsidizing bail sounds odd to the modern ear, it is only
because our legal culture has forgotten the traditional concept of
bail as a surety system. Common modern notions about bail—e.g.,
that bail allows defendants to purchase freedom from jail or that
bail gives defendants incentives to appear at trial by threatening
them with financial forfeitures—are anathema to the traditions
of bail. Indeed, defendants traditionally could not leave jail at any
price without sureties and were prohibited from using indemnity
agreements to insulate their sureties from bond forfeitures.
To the extent that many poor defendants today cannot afford
bail sureties, the straightforward modern solution is for
275
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governments to subsidize the sureties. That approach becomes
even more sensible once bail is viewed as Blackstone viewed it—
as a somewhat more “friendly” substitute for the four walls of a
jail. Subsidizing bail sureties is thus simultaneously novel and
deeply historical. It takes the traditional notion of bail as a surety
system—a notion still expressly enshrined in many state constitutions—and updates it quite modestly with a modern, law and
economics approach to governmental subsidies.
Finally, as a solution to the modern problem of the over-jailing (and under-bailing) of poor defendants, ending the asymmetric subsidies for jail versus bail is a far better approach than the
currently popular reform proposal of abolishing bail altogether
and relying more heavily on governmental actors and institutions. The current problem with excessive pretrial detention
arises from too many resources being devoted to the governmental institution known as jail. Attempting to solve that problem by
shifting even more power to government institutions is a deeply
troubling step. Subsidizing bail sureties preserves a time-honored
way for private actors to check governmental abuse, bias, and incompetence, and the bidding process proposed in this Article
holds out the hope of harnessing innovation and competition to
curb excessive incarceration.

